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Chapter I 
Introduetion 
tiJ:xcess is that which pa.sses lillit s; it, usuall.y 
(but not al.ways) conveys a demgator·y implication."* 
•P.ro-ti ts is the· excess of returns of incaa:e over 
expenclit.lU"es in a giYen tranaactiaa, business, or the !.ike; . 
as: the excess (gross pro·fi. t) ot gross receipts oyer tbe 
expenditures directly involved; or the net proceeds (net 
prof'i t) obtained by deducting f'raa the gross proceeds all 
torms ot expenses o.r outlay."** 
~ is a charge; especially a pecuniary burden 
imposed by authari ty; ape cif'ically a charge, usually pecu-
niary, laid upon persons or property for public use.•*** 
~here fore tor our purpose here, let us define Excess Prof'i ts 
Taxes (which shall be symbolized as EPf hereafter) as a 
charge leTied on the proti ts ot a corporation whi.ch Congress 
determines are over end abo"t'e the usual rate of return on 
i.nvested caJ1ta1 :tor the economy on a whol.e. 
In order to better und:erstand the effects ot an 
Excess Profits Tax, we shoul.d perbaps becOJile acquainted with 
the history ot such taxation in Ollr conntry. ~ tirst auoh 
measue legislated by Congress •as during the :tirst world war 
*9, P• 351. 
**9, p. 769. 
***9, p. 985. 
2 . 
and al.though it tlid increase our revenue., it. was ot no 
great significance since 1 t was a new form ot taxa.t1an on 
the par"t pt the GoverD118Qt and not too •ell executed. But, 
at the outbreak ot world War II, our ce»ntry was compelled to 
enter that branch of taxation called tt:Exces.s Proti ts Tax•, 
and it was in the Revenue Act of 1940 that the EXcess Protita 
'fax was 1Daugurated. It would be 111.p()ssible to go into 
3 . 
detail. here, but I feel there are soma points which demand 
explanation. :KX.cess Profits 7ax •s a graduate« tax and 
reached a maxia •t ~. file base-period to be tour years 
trom. 1936 to 1g39. fte credits could be determined by e:lther 
ot two •thods. Iirst, the average-earning 11atb.od based on 
the theory tbat the profits were normal during the tour years, 
ancl secondly, the investment·c~pital. JDathod, 'baaed on the 
theory tbat the sole standard ot e:xcessi veneas ot proti ts waa 
in relation to a rate of returns on invested capital. The 
rates ot exeaption used were 9~ tor- -the average-earning 
method and 8~ tor the investm.ent-oapi tal method. 
fte most. iaportant :revisicn to the Excess Pro:t:tta 
'!'ax ~ 1.940 caae in the Revenue Act ot 1942 wbe n the Excess 
Pro:ti ta 'fax credit was revised so that one -might substitute 
tor the lowest ot tb8 base-period years 75~ o:r. the average 
tor the three other years, and tbe graduated rate was raiaed 
to ~. J.lso, if' any t:actor during the base-period 4i.stoned 
the nomal. earnings, a provision was included whereby you 
coul.d redetermine the base-period. The Excess Pl"o:f'1t.~ 'fax 
was repealed in the Revell~ Act of ~94.5 and became effective 
after December 31, 1945. 
No•, we are faced w.i th a new Excess Profits Tax 
tor on J"anuary 2, 1951, Congress passed a new Excess Proftta 
Tax which is a 50~ levy on exoess proti ts. Since this law 
contains many loopholes, in ordel" to satisfy all the expected 
complaints, it is impossible to outline the ooaplete tax law 
here. Bnt basically, it is the same as the Revenue Act of 
19"-2 wit~h a revision of rates and m..ore reliefs. 
~is thesis shall deal with the effects of an 
Exeess Profits 'fax oa business wi thOllt any reference to a 
particular law. It w~ld be impossible to present a paper 
at this time because of the world condi tioa.s. At this very 
moment, Congress is considering changing the rates and 
relie,fs in the present act. So, I shall. deal with the 
effect of a basic law with relation to specific Industries 
and Co.lllpanies. 
Can we increase our demands on Corpore. tion by 
&xcess Profits Taxes at this time? !'here are many pros and 
ccm.s to the question. Mr. George Ericson, writing -tor the 
Christian Science Monitor on October 7, 1950 said, "JJore 
people, and amol!l.g these congressmen are ino1uded, feel the 
push behind the Excess Profits Tax is l.argely politieally 
and morally - political because the labor tmions are strongly 
tor it, moral because the public believes•doll.ars mnat be 
4 . 
drafted' as well as mnpower." And al.s(), it has been said: 
" by :ur • .Utred G, :Buehler that, "Despite the heaT,)' tax bur-
den and the ~ikel.ihood tba t. it 111 11 be increased, indus:tria 1 
companies will DB:ke every ettart to U..crease sales and boost 
gross earning$ in order to maintain their stSllding in com.-
peti tion, cost accmmtuts tleclered last week. Reports 
that some companies might slow down their etfcrts in order 
to avoid reaching the highest surplus protit:s brackets which. 
woald draw a tax ot 50 per- cent were scouted. 
Accountants pointed a.tt that lt.O company, regard-
l.ess ot what tax rate its earnings will invite, can attord 
to allow competition to gain on it. JUSt as some Engl.ish 
companies, which bave nothing to advertise, continue to keep 
their names before the public in newspapers and magaz~es, 
so must or-ganizations here maintain the highest sales pace 
possible so that, when the defense program is ended and taxes 
are reduced, they will not be at a disadvantage, it was said." 
Since an Excess Profits Tax is 1n effect, what 
results shall it. bave on the price of lsbor and mater·ial.s? 
'.roday the companies who are in a highly competitive market 
are stri v.Lng to keep the cost of manufacturing at a minimwl. 
in order to ba.ve its products sell at the lowest possible 
price. 'fhis is attained only through the untiring eftorts 
of manageJEnt and 1t we begin to tax the profits or the re-
ward tor managements an.d owners efforts to the extent ot 
removing this inceutive, profit-s, what will happen to prices? 
The offic.ials will offer little or no resistance to labor 
for higher wages, nor will they strive to reduce the cost 
of materials. 
We must also consider the effect an Excess Profita 
Tax w111 ba ve on di tferen t companies. Let us take tor example 
a. company whi.ch has just begun operations and tax the largest 
part of its profit through Excess Profits Tax. In reality, 
this concern is in a dilemma tor it cannot expand nor can it 
obtain a solid financial footing, and yet if it liquidates 
it. proba'bl.y will lose eTerything. What happens? you wi-ll 
then have very few new businesses; investors are not willing 
to take such risks" 
Now let us l .ook back to the war years and see some 
ot the pros and cons in btm:siness. Public Utili ties were 
probably the most affected by an Excess Profits ~ax. They 
came under the Public Utilities Commission who regulated 
their rate of profit and they were al.so taxed under the 
.Excess Profits Tax Law. On the other hand, the Railroads 
were least affected by the EX6eas Profits Tax due to their 
large Bonded debt aad also their large Capitalization. ~i1-
roads, however, did not have to pay a dam·ging Excess Profits 
'!'ax and hance they made terrific profits. 'this was :tair? 
were all things coJt.sidered when the Excess PrOfi ta 
Tax was passed January 2, 1951? It would certainly appear to 
be so but according to present ecnditions, a revision is in 
o. 
the mking. The most tragic thing of it all is that one is 
led to believe that Excess Profits Tax is here to stay and 
unless it is managed properly, it could mean the end of our 
great capitalistic economy. 
As w:as stated betore, it would be a physical impos~ 
a1b1lity to present a th.esis on this subject if I did not 
IIB'.ke some 11aitat1Cils. In this tbesis I • interested in 
the ettect of an Excess Pl'oti ts Tax on Bnsiness and am 
trying to show the economic sigDifieance in our present day 
economy. In so doing, I shall use four of our leading indus-
tries with a representation of three companies in each which 
are considered apropos. . By using the experience I have 
gained during the _l:fl·st, thrcugh studying the legislation of 
the Excess Profits Tax, I shall try to point out what etfects 
it will have on the businesses considered and take into con• 
sideration the otter torces and elements which are necessary 
for this analysis. 
?. 
Chapter II 
Automobile Indnstry 
1. Ge.ne ral Jlotors Corporation 
General Motors was incorporated on October 1~, 
1916 in Delaware to take over the stock ot $eneral Motors 
Company (a New Jersey Corporation) on a basis of 1 1/3 shares 
of 6'/J preferred stock for each share of 7~ pr.eterred stock 
and 5. shares of its common for each share of General Jloters 
Ooapany co•on stock. 
From. this t1m.e on, General Motors Corporation has 
grown tremendously, through tbe acquisition of aany smaller 
companies with cash or tbe exchange of stock or mergers. In 
1917, E. I. DuPont of Neaours & Company began to purchase 
stock in General Motors and by 1922 owned about 37.0~; in 
1949, the investment was 22.6'1~ or outstanding stock. During 
the twenties when DuPont was interested in General Rotors, 
tbe Company was at a low ebb in its history, ~or after the 
war large inventories were built up and now they could not be 
DlOVed. !fhe DuPont company invested about t&O,ooo,ooo in cash 
~d sane of their well trained personnel who, through their 
efforts and excellent ju4glll.ell.t, were able to place General 
)(otors on a good financial footi:Qg and were able to continue 
operation so that today they are the largest and about the 
strongest in the industry. 
General Jlotor s Cerporation is chiefly an operating 
company, and their ~n prodnct is automobiles and auto acces-
e. 
sory and parts. 'rhe trade name of the cars sold are :Buick, 
Cadi.lle.c, Chevrolet, Oldsmobile and Pontiac • 'fhe Company also 
manuractures truclcs and co~ches UDder the D811l.e of Chevrolet 
and G.M.c. Some of its non-automotive produc.ts of the company 
are Deleo Products and Radio, lliesel Equipmeat, J!rigidaire 
Electric Bange and Refrigerator, Delco Appliance, etc. 
As to the pro4uction of cars as a percentage ot aU 
cars registered, GMC ranks tops with a better than 40~ av~age 
s~ce World War I!. 
1940 
47.~ 
194& 
37.~ 
1947 
41.9. 
1949 
42.9~ 
!he prod~tion in 1949 was 2,16.,406 passenger cars and 
499,991 trucks end coaches produced in the UJ11 ted States alld 
CaDil.da. In 1950 there were 3,812;163 passenger cars, trucn, 
and coaches lll8llufactured• General J!otors also has production 
abroad thron.gh its subsidiaries 1n :England, Australia and Ger-
many, and in 1949, their total production was 131,~51 units. 
Doring the war, General Motors production consisted 
chiefly of _war materials, and . some ot the products were shell$ 
aDl casings, airplane eng1Des, ccmplete bomber and fighter 
plames, tanks, tank destroyers and ~ored cars, trucks, 
aaphibioua ducks, cannon .so calibre and .5o calibre machine 
guns, carbines, gyroscopes, electric motors ot all sizes, 
ruses, ball and roller bearings, and a major part of all the 
Diesel engtnes produced tor United States Ar.ay aad Navy use. 
9. 
;Deli Teries or. war products made by General Motors throagh the 
war aggregated some $1.2,521,789',412. 
!he JDanageaent. bas beea extrellely ettioient and 
l.O. 
has brcnght the Coapany thratgh al.l its dittieulties with 
success. !hey ba·Te been able to 11aintai.n a peacetul relation-
ship llith labor a.nd ba.ve aot ba~ any great interruptions in 
over tive years. The Oom.paay has set up a retireMnt program 
tor its employers and also employs a bonus progrem.. As to 
the tinaneial progress, the manageme always maintained 
a strong cash p·osi tion. and its incre 'Se in production ett1-
oiency bas added more revenue with n extra capital outlay. 
Also, they have been the leaders in ew design w.ith greatest 
return to the customer :fo·r the price 
Since the General Motors c , porat1on has made such 
progress dawn thrCDgh the years, at.e now asks the question, 
•now will the new EXcess PTofits Tax attect the Companya. It 
is foolhardy to believe that an Exce s Profits Tax will ha.ve 
no ettect. But, we are interested i how iaportant a part 
the new tax will play in respect to neral Motors. One way 
to determine the relation woUld be try and analyze the 
progress .ot the Company since 1940 u 
between 1.940 and 1944, GeQral llotors 
il the present day, for 
Pro tits 
'rex. In stydying the i.Dlpor'tant eleme ts, we ean try am 
estia te the ettects ot tbe 'tax in tlm fa"ture. 
;1.939· 
Schedu1e .~ Working Cati tal_ Ratios. 
cs·ouroe is Moody's Inves ora service) 
1.940 1941 1948 19.45 
2.58 a.o 1•99 a.oa 
19ot.6 194:7• 1948 194~ 
5.35 2:.38 a.s5 3.60 
194:4 
a.ae 
1.950· 
2.~5 
In 1-9·4:9, the ratio waa at a subatan. tia.lly sate margin but in 
1950 whan the new ~cess ProtJ.:ts ~-x was put into ettect, it 
fell. ott abon.t .'1 ot a point. If no E:xcess Profits T.ax bad 
to be paid, the adjusted ratio would be about 3.15 till8s. 
Schedule ot Cash an.d !larkstable seeuritie.a (In m11110DS) 
T!oiree l'Sl!itoOttyf s fnves'tor a serno.e) 
1939 1940 l9.U 1942 l.i:43 194:4 
Cash t154.9 1282.9 $196 128'1 $586.9 1169 
Ilk. s.e. · 132 148.9 19.9 000 82'1.5 42'1.5 
!rotal. 1186.9 14!1.8 tns.o t!W $$!4.4 t596.5 
1945 1M6 19,., 1.948 19.9 1150· 
eash 1201 $355 tl&9.8 1290 1893 ·3~4: 
Mk. See. 176 000 150 589.5 485 646 
~ota.t _., t!B t!fi9.8 t779.5 tl'm t"§5'6 
The cash balances ot the Company a1so tell during 
the early forties, but not to any great extent. one may wonder 
why in 1943 and 1944. there was auch an increase over 1942. 
~his can be pertly explained by the facts that in 1943 (1) 
earniDgs of about 154: ~~lion were retained, (2:) there W'aa an 
increase in contingen.ci es and reba,.b111 ta.tion ot about $35 .• 5 
million, (3) aboo:t $5~ aill.ion 1n excessive dol.lar deprecia~ion 
was charged -ror new. oonst:ruf:tion an4 amortization at_ s.pecia1 
'tools, ( 4) an increase ot abw t $25.3 million due to aequi-
- . 
si t:ion of Ye1la. ~ruck &. Coach Manutactur ing Compmy on 
· se.pte.lllber 30, 1945, and (5·) a decrease ot about 115.4 
million in prepaid expens.es• While in 1944, earnings or 
about 130 million were retained in the businea.s, excessi w 
depreciation as in 1943, and also a reduction in the pay-
ment of 1943's Excess Proti'ts -rax ot $1'1.58 million. In 
1950, it an adjustment for exeeas profi'ts tax is ma.de, the 
cash would be abmt $155 llilllon less, assuaing that cash 
pa.y~~ent bas not been made. 
been 
1939 
11.37 
1945 
$3.1.3 
Schedule Net Sales {in billions) 
(Source is. Moody's Investors service) 
19-'0 1941 1942 19<1$ 
·1~79 12:.44 $2.2:5 .3.79 
19.&6 194'7 1948· 194:9 
$1.96 $3.82 $4.70 .5.'10 
19« 
14.26 
19.50 
$7.55 
ft.e aal.es tor the General Motors Corporation have 
steadily on the upgrade. In 1.946• produc-tion was ad-
a. 
yez·sely affected by the UAW-OIO Union strike against General 
Jlotors Corporation and by material shortages, resulting from 
strikes in suppl.iers plants, for the most part. There were 
'Yirtual1y no cars or trucks produced in the first quarter. 
Higher p:~rices have caused part or the inchase, but increased 
production bas been the main reason. In cars. and trucks alone, 
the output bas about dar bled from. 1939 to 1949. 
Schedule at Net Income after ~axes {in millions) 
(Souree-ri Moody's. Investors ser.vice) -
1939 
$183 
194:5 
1188 
1940 
t195 
1946 
$87.5 
1941 1942 
$201.7 . 1163.5 
194:'1 1948 
$2.87. g, 1440 
1943 1944 
1149.7 $170.9 
1949 1950 
1656 te34 
Bet income bas also increased, but to a greater 
degree than sales, because of the efficiencies eaployed. 
Sales ba.ve increased about 5.5 times in dollar Tal.ue, while 
income 4•65 times. If no excess profits tax was in ef'fect, 
the increase would have been 6.4. 
19-'0 
$76.8 
194:6 
Schedule of' Other Income 'fax (in Mill~ons) 
(Source:fs Moody's Investors. Service) 
1941 1942 .1943 1944: 1945 
$102.8 $85.2 tsl.'l 197.7 t24c.5 
194'1 1948 1949 1950 
(cr. · 151.8) $23~ :...2 $32~3 ·~68 ts22.37 
AnOther consideration sb:onld be gl.ven to other taxes 
paid by the General Jlotors Corporation. 'fh.e oomplny has con-
tributed a good sbare ot its profits to· the Government sinc.e 
its organizaticn, and the earnings bave been reduced con-
siderably by the taxes. 
Schecmle of' Incom.e end Taxes E!!:Jlef sales (sourceis YlOody~:rnvestOrs er . ee) 
1940; 1941 1948 1943 1944 1945 
.Income tJ-0.90 18~88 $7.87 t3.95 $4:.01 16.02 
'l&Xes &.96 .11.9·2 5.69 .6.62 6.34 .81 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Income $4.46 $7.55 J9.36 tl-1.52 $11.04: 
!faxes {cr.. $2.26) 6.97 7.68 s.21 12.95 
14 • . 
.&nother interesting :teature is the consideration 
-
Gt ineane and taxes per IJ-00 sales. ~· taxes in 1950 were 
more tbe.:n. 12le amwnt of income availabl.e tor d1 Tidends. It 
no excess profits tax was in effect, the amount of money going 
to taxes out of tl.OO would be $10.92. Even though the effi-
ciency ot General Jlotors bas increased, this seving will go 
to taxes. ~e amount, per $1.00 of sales, ot income be:tore 
taxes has increased 14.26 frcn 1.949 to 1950 but ~e income 
decreased t.4B. Renee, the increase went to taxes al.ong with 
$.48 ot regular income. 
Schedule .!?..!. Ear~s 1!!.!: Share of COilBIOn Stock: (source is ()yts Inves'Eors SerVice) 
1940 
p.l6 
1946 $.88 
1.941. 
.2.82 
1947 
13.1.2. 
1948 1943 1944 
$1. 7'15. . 11· 61.5 11.84: 
1.94:8 
$4.86 
1.94:9 
.7.5! 
19~ 
t2,055 
Hoa it excess prof1ts tax was not in effect, tne 
earnings wDUl.d be increased in 1950., by about t2.84, lll!llting 
ear.ni~s in 1.950 around $12.1.9. 
Divideads paid ayer the period have been quite sub-
stantial. In fact, the company has distr1 buted most ot its 
earnings to its stoCkholders, to the tune ot ~s.~. r.r the 
excess profits tax was not in et:tect, the aempany wcnl.d ba.Te 
diatribut.ed more dQlle.r di. Yidends to its owners. 
Schedule of Dividends Paid (Sonree is Mbodyts .Investors service) 
19-lO 1941 
IJ..875 .1.875 
194:6 194'1 
tl.l25 tl.50 
1942 
$1.00 
1948 
$2.25 
~943 
fl.OO 
1949 $4.0& 
1944 
tJ-.50 
1950 
t&.oo 
194:5 
$1.50 
Schedule .!! Excess Prot! t .s 'fax (in millions) 
(Sou.rce is itoolyts Inves'tors serviee) . 
-
1940- l9U l-94:2 1943 1945 1950 
. $40•76 1171.93 $30.3'1 $158.28 IJ.58.14: tl55.2 
One must remember tba t. the l-950 tax is only 1~ 
because it is figured on only a hal.f year at 3~• If the 
tull 3~ was used, the tax would be t3l0•4 mil1ion dollars. 
During the war years, the tax was not great in relation to 
the amoa.nt paid today, but w.e m.us:t understand that during 
the war, t .he income was limited by Government cont-racts 
which were cost-plus. IJ'oday, this situation does not exis:t, 
so that the sales are higber, likewiSe the tax. Also, 
15. 
during the war induatry -..as expanding to meet the em.ergency, 
whereas today; the expansion prograa has been cut considerably, 
althoagh the caapany is still gra.ing. 
Schedule ot Net Plaat A.aseta (in lllillioua) 
(SC1nroe1s· Moolyis Investors service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 19M 1945 
$402.6 $409.8 $571~.5 l32'l ~"a P98~5 $549.8 
1946 1947 1948 1941 1950 
$608.0 1722.9 17'75.1 1'1'1'1•4 $801 
The growth of the company can be shown in part, by 
the increase in net property over the years. During the war, 
there was a decrease in the net asset value of the property, 
because the Government permitted the write-off of plant and 
equipment, at a faster rate, if it was used for war production. 
The asset as a matter of fact did increase, for since they 
could not be used for civilian production in later years, 
they were written off and by so doing the tax liability was 
decreased. Since the war, the additions have more than 
doubled. 
General Motors Corporation has not been affected 
by the excess profits tax to any great extent. True that iD 
1950, the tax was for only one-half a year and they paid 
about $155,000,000, but their sales increased almost two 
billion dollars. The earnings increased to $9-.35 per share, 
or $2.03 per share which is fine since other companies 
showed a decrease in earnings per share. 
An important factor to consider is the apparent 
reaso.n tor the increase in sales. Since Korea, the people 
of this country have been purchasing beyond th~ir needs. 
They were afraid tbat we were going to have shortages, 
rationing and the like, so the natural inclination was to 
buy, buy and buy, to protect for tuture wants. At the end 
of 1950, and the first part of 1951, their bin a ha.ve been 
fi~ed and now they are waiting. We have no war but the 
l. '1. 
peop1e have no more room to stock-pile either. ~he result is 
that the sales for this year are bound to drop off and if the 
economic outlook continues, the prices will come down. General 
Motors Corporation did quite wel1 in this fictitious and panic 
buying boom, tor their sales increased almost $2 billion while 
in other years the increase had been only about $.1 billion. 
Due to the tax structure of the new excess profits 
tax, a credit of 85% for the 3 years of the best 4 years 
between 1946 and 1949, could be taken. Since General Motors 
corporation did so well during these years, the tax at 30~, 
will not affect General Motors Corporation too greatly. on 
the othe.r hand, if the credit p.ercentage was reduced and the 
rate was increased substantially, General Motors Corporation 
could be placed in a precarioua position. On the whole 
though, General Motors sh~ld be able to surviTe much more 
easily than a great many of its competitors. Jlso, they shall 
be able to earn aboat $5 per share of common stock before 
be~ng affected by Excess Profits Tax. 
2. Studebaker Corpomtion 
ft.e Studebaker Coiporation was incorporated in 
Delaware, J~uary 26, 1935 as a result ot a reorgaaization. 
The original Studebaker ao:r;pora,tion was organized February 
18. 
11, 1911 to take over the property and business ot EVeritt-
lletzger-F-landers Company and Stu~ebalmr Brothers Manufacturing 
Company. In its reorganization, the studebaker Corporation 
not only acqui~d the old Studebaker Corporation but also the 
business and properties of :Rockne Motors Corporation. 
The oaapany plan$ is ~ooated in South Bend, 
Indiana along with its administration of.tices. In 1948, the 
G'ODlpa.ny purchased from the United states GoverJllDent another 
pl.ant in South Bend, Indialla, which contains about one 
million s.quare teet ot floor space, to be used for truck 
assembly. 
'fhe purpose of the company is the manufacturing 
and selling of passenger automobiles, trucks, and bus 
obasses, and cOIIIIUroial cars. Along with the IB8nutaoturing 
ot the main produc-ts, parts am aooessorie s are a1so· produced. 
'.roday, studebaker is the :rourth largest company 
in the manutacturing or- automobiles and sixth in the pro-
ductiOD ot trucks with a 5.'1~ of all new truck registrations 
1n the United States. A. schedule of the actual IW.IIlber ot 
cars manufactured over the years is aa tol1ows: 
Schedule ~ ~asengers, Cars, !!:! Trucks Sold (in thousands) 
1940 ~941 1946 194.7 1.948 1949 
119•5 1~5 .• 8 120.7 191.5 233.4 304.9 
1950 
354.5 
During the war, studebaker manufactured 63,789 
Flying Fortress engines, 197,678 military trucks, Weasels, 
and civilian trucks which were authorized by the Government. 
Tbe value ot materials sold during the war was almost $1 
.b-illion two-hlUldred aillion dollars. ($1,2oo,ooo,ooo, figures 
taken f'roa the 1945 .AD.nml Report page 14). 
Schecblle at· War~ Ca~1ta1 Batioa (Srurce is iOodyis ~ves ora SerVice) 
1940 1941 1943 1943 1944 1945 
2.48 1.95 1•54 1.39. 1.55 3..66 
1946 1947 19~ 1949 1950 
2.18 1.91 1.74 2.22 2.86 
~ ratio ot Currant Assets to Current Liabilities 
has remined quite good except during the war and in 1947 and 
· 1948. During the war tbe. ratio declined because of the heavy 
tax burden tl:e com.pany was carrying. The sallie etfe4t, ot a . 
J.o• ratio, was. experienced by practically all companies. during 
this period however. In 1947 and 1948, you had the resul ta 
of the eon version from war to peace production. During 1947, 
studebaker spent almost $9 million for increased facilities 
and replacement. In 1948, expansion was eantinued and a part 
of tbe funded debt was retired. Also the company introduced 
a revo~utionary post-war mode1 ear that was quick~y accepted 
by the people • In order to accomplish this teat • a large 
out-la:y of machine tools am equipment was necessary which 
in tum required much cash and therefore llorking Capital was 
reduced. Another consi-deration which is of importance is the 
fact that althou:gh the ratio of Current Assets to Current 
Liabilities bas decreased, the total Net Working Capital 
increased. 
Schedule ,2!: Cash ~Marketable Securities tin millions) 
1940 1.941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Cash $10.6 $15.5 $17.5 taa.4 $31.8 $18.5 
Mk.Sec. 4.2 
'lotal t!F.'r 
194:6 1.9.4:7 1948 1949 1950 
cash $15.4 $26.6 $32.0 .40.0 $30.2 
Mk.Seo. 5.0 11..1 14.1. 16.'1 
ti5:4 $31":'6 tir.r $54':T t"U:J 
'lhe over all Cash position of Studebaker Corporation 
in the last few years has been superior to the early forties. 
- In 1945, we had a decline as the result ot a drop in sales. 
ao. 
Aft~r the war, you had the period of converting back to peace-
time oc:nstrue-tion. In 1946, the reconversion was about ended 
when we began to have labor disputes and as a result, short-
ages of material. Hence, these conditions affected studebaker. 
Schedule ~Net Sales (in millions) 
{Source is Moody' a Investors Service) 
19'40 1941. 
$84.1 tll6 
1947 
$258 
1942 
$22J. 
1949 
$473 
1.9:43 
t3M 
1950 
$477 
1944 
$416 
The net sales of the corporation have been on the 
increase over the years. As was previous.~y stated, the decline 
1n 1946 can be attributed to the economic conditions ot the 
country on the whole. There w·ere only a few e(lllpanie s that 
did not suffer this sharp drop, and Studebaker fared better 
than most companies which had depressed sales. 
Schedule .2f. Ket IneCIIte After Taxes (in millions) 
[Souree-ri Moadyts Investors Service} 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$2.1 $2.4 $2.0 $2.8 $4.0 $3.2 
1946 1.94'7 1948 194.9 1950 
• • 9 $9.L $19.1 t27,5 $22.5 
!rhe net income of the company has been steadily 
on the up grade. During the war years, due to the heavy 
Excess Profits Tax, the income of studebaker was small. In 
1945, the company su ftered a net loss of $8.1 million before 
taxes but since they were able to oft-set this loss against 
past years gains, they obtained a tax credit of $9.1 million 
and hence were able to show a net income for the period. In 
19~50, the company suffered a decline in sales and net income. 
The cost of goods sold was increased over $11 million due to 
a change of models. It is apparent that the new ear did not 
a•l1 too well because all other companies in the industry 
showed an increase in sales and income, while Studebaker's 
income fell and the increase in sales was negligible. 
2l.. 
Schedule .£!_ Other lncome Taxes (in millions) 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service} 
1940 1941 1942 1945 19« 1945 
•• 64 tl.75 •• 7 tl.l. .1.7 $.52 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
$1.4: $5.9 $13.2 $17.2 $15.6 
Although the tax rates had been reduced after the 
war, the taxes J&id by Studebaker have increased considerably 
over the war years. This can be expl.a.ined by the fact that 
during the earl.y forties, the deprecia t1on taken on new equip-
.me.nt was larger and also Excess Profits Taxes were paid. 
Sche.dule o:r Excess Profits Taxes Paid Uf millions) 
(Source is Moody's Investors-8e ce) 
1942 
$4.699 
1943 
$13.08 
1944 
$13.93 
1950 
$1.00 
In 1946, there was a credit of over $9 million received by 
the Studebaker Corporation which would have been increased 
by $1•4 million but this alll(Alnt we$ paid by the subsidiaries. 
Because of this tax credit, the com.pany w.as able to show a 
profit for the year. The EXcess Profits Tax in 1950 did 
affect the com};Sny to a great degree, for they had to pa:y a 
tax even though they suffered a bad year. 
Schedule- of Inco·me and ~xes .E!£ $100 Of Sa.le,s 
(source is Moody's Invelrtor·s service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 194:4 1.945 
Income 
.2.52 $2.15 $.92 $.78 • .• 97 11~56 
Taxes .'16 .56 .13 .59 .23 .15 
E.P.If. 2.44 a.a6 2..95 3.20 (See page 23 for rest of schedule) 
22. 
1946 
Inconte $.67 
Taxes (cr.6.42) 
E.P.if. 
1947 
.3.42 
2.19 
1948 
t4.98 
3.44 
1949 
$5•82 
3.64 
1950 
t4.78 
3.2'15 
.ooa 
It is always interesting to see what effects are 
shown by taxes on the bases of sales per $100, and also in-
come. The Excess Profits Taxes took a great portion of the 
earnings per $100 of sales during the war. In fact, the 
taxes were greater than the income earned after taxes. under 
the ne~ tax law, the ef'f'eet is not too great under the per-
centage of sales, but the normal and sur tax have taken a 
tidy sim. The reason tor the low Excess Profits Tax is that 
during the ne~ base period, 'the income was substantial enc:ugb. 
to etfeet a good credit with an estimated excess profits tax 
base of $30,ooo,ooo. Hence since the net income before taxes 
was less tban last year and only a little more than the 
average of the base period, a small Excess Profits Tax was 
paid. But, with anticipated increases in sales, the Excess 
Profits Tax next year shall be substantially higher. 
Schedule of Ear11ings 1!.!. Share of' Common Stock 
(Source is Moody's InvestorsserVice) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$.96 tl•l2 t•92 $1.2:3 $1.74 tl.39 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
•• 40 $3.87 IB.ll $11.'10 t9.55 
The earnings on a per share basis have shown great 
prospect. During the war, the earnings were quite ce-.naer-
vative as they were in all inda stries throughout the country. 
Since the war, the increase b!s been substantia1 end in most 
cases, if' we consider that on1y a few years back the com.pany 
went through a reorganization, Studebaker Corporation has 
done e:rtremly well. The . drop in ee. rning s in 1950 may be 
considered abnormal since most of the other companies in the 
indnstry showed an increase. Hcmever since the same manage-
ment who guided the company through the war and showed such 
skill in revamping the position of Studebaker Corporation is 
still in control, the temporary decline wil1 be quickly 
remedied. 
1940 
n11 
1946 
$ .50 
Schednle of Dividends Paid 
(Source is Moody's Inv-estors Service) 
1941 1942 1943 19-14 
nil nil I • 25 • .50 
194'1 1948 19·4~ 1950 
• •50 $1.75 ta.5o :13.55 
The dividend policy ot tlm.e company has 
1945 
t .50 
been e::z:-
tremely poor fmm. an inves1:or' s point of view. ~hat is to. 
say, if' you are interested in qaick gains, aad large divi• 
dends, Studebaker Corpom tion never obliged• Their policy 
has been quite conservative and since the reoxganization, they 
have paid out aboo.t 20~ of earnings. The management believes 
1n reinvesting earnings so that the borrowed debt can be kept 
at a minimum.. ~his polio y is certainly an amiable one for a 
COIILpeny grows either through new invested eapi tal or rein-
Tested earnings. 
From. the standpoint of taxes, the COIII.pany, since it 
1s in a stage of growth, is most severely- punished for it 
needs all its capital for expansion. An Excess Profits Tax 
hurts a growing company much more than an established firm 
because grow. th is speeded up m t ot tb.ose extra earnings or 
the top dollars which management are able to obtain beca1111se 
O·f their economies and managerial skill. Now in Studebaker's 
case, aceord1ng to past experiences, they have been trying 
to expand through reinvested earnings to some 80~ worth.. 'fo 
them, those top dollars mean a great deal tor they are eom-
peti:ng 111 th well established tims who c.a:a. and are full 
25. 
grown. True, tbe com);8nies can still expand but growth is ot 
little interest to them for they are able to expand out of 
their reserves. This point has not been reached by Studebaker 
and until that time comes, the Corporation will feel the pain 
or Excess Profits Tax. 
1949 
$].6.6 
1946 
125.9 
SchedUle of Net Assets tin millions~ (source !S"'llooay's Inves ors seriic• . 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
tl-4.4 111.2. tlo.a tlO.ti 
' 194'1 1948 1949 1950 
ta&.9 ts7.1 p'1.5 .50.3 
file net assets ot studebaker have been 
1945 
117.7 
on the in-
crease and rurther substantiate my claim ot an expanding 
com.pany. During the war, t :he expansion was tor war material 
and hence were written ott, so, the decline in net assets. 
But when the p.eace treaty was signed, Studebaker began on 
its long expansion pr-ograa. Through the reinvesting or 
earnings aDd with borrowed capital.., the co,mpany was able to 
pmgress and build up its production program. In 1950, the 
eomp:1 ny invested about 115 million in retooling, mostly for 
th& new '1'-8 engine, and will coneen trate civilian production 
on the higher priced car in 1951 which is more profitable. 
l94Cl 
ts.a 
1946 
tl4.5 
Schedule of Lon~ !era Debt: (in millions} 
( SOlirce IS Moo y t s Invea'tors servi ee) . 
l94:l. 1942 1943 19« 1945 
.5.4 .4.4 0 0 tl0•5 
1947 1948 194:9 19.50 
114.0 tJ-2.75 $9.5 .9.0· 
Because of the conserYati ve policy and excellent: 
mamgeme nt ot the officers of Studebaker, this funded debt 
ot 'the company bas been smll. · Yhis debt c c:nsists in 
3 1/S'J, SiDkiD.g FUnd Debentures due December 1, 1966, and a 
sinld.l:tg fund provision tor a partie. 1 redemption each year is 
provided. The fixed charges are earned as follows: 
19~ 1941 1942 1943 1.944 1945 
5.88 6.19 5.25 8.42 6.2'1 8.6'1 
194:6 1947 1948 1949 
4.38 20.5S 35.05 56.55 
In 1950, the interest on the oollded. de.b"t as compared with 
1949 of 68.12 tiJaes was earned 73.32 times, The aa:rety o:r 
these debentues is iaproTing steadily and the rate ot 
charges times earnings is excellent. 
fte management ot Studebaker Corporation is con-
sidered as one of the finest in the buSiness. 'fhey bave nursed 
the company out of the reorganization into a prosperous and 
thriving enterprise. During the war, they were on defense 
work aa all industry was but with Ule end of hostilities, 
Stuclebaar began to spread its wings. It began one of the 
rinest sales promotions ot this day; it had revolutionized 
ita new model car and within a year its sa lea soared. How-
ever, this was made possible through the repeal of the Ex-
cess Profits Tax in 1945. 
Since the growth ot Studebaker was intensified 
after the war and i• continuing, an Excess Profits Tax at 
thu time eould prove extremely dangerous· to its growth ror 
even thoogh a la·rge credit is obtained it is not su.fficient 
to parmi t the continuing exp1nsion. S1noe the reduction of 
taxes,. Studebaker was able to inc:reasa its perceiitage or. total 
cars and trucks produced from 2 1/2 to 4 1/2 of the amount 
manufactured in the industry. rn order to accoaplish this 
feat, t -he ccmpany was compelled to borrow some $18,000,000. 
But if the Excess Profits Tax "'as in effect, the Studebaker 
Corporation would bave bad to make a loan of $30,000,000 to 
finanoe the expansion as Mr. Vance, president of Studebaker 
Corporation, tes.ti:f'ied before a congressional committee in-
Test1gating bas1nesa conditious 1a preparation for the ne~ 
Excess P.rofi t s Tax. 
Al.though ther·e are relief' clauses tor growth ot' 
companies in the new Excess Profits Tax, they have not helped 
Studebaker too greatly. A company who has a good conser-
vative, :tinanoial. po.licy as Studebaker Corporation does not 
beneti t too· greatly by the e:x:eep·tions. It is d1 fticul t to 
eone-ei ve that a eoiJlpany with such a good record and a manage-
ment who is so earnest,. should be compelled to curtail its 
program of expansion, The Excess Profits Tax in the case ot 
Studebaker presents a great problem and they shall sutter by 
the enactment of' a permanent law, Under the present law, 
they shall be able to earn aboo..t $7 per share of' common 
before an Excess Profits Tax is paid. 
2.9. 
3. Chrysler Qorp~ation 
!fhe Chrysler Corporation was incorporated in the 
State of Delaware on June 6, 1925 to acquire the property and 
business of the Ma:nell Motor Corporation and the stock of 
Ohal.IIers Motor Oorporatio.n. On JUly 30, 1938, t~e Chrysler 
Corp·oration obtained the as.sets and b.lsiness of Dodge Brothers 
Incorpo~ated thrc:ngh the exchange of stock. !he Chrysler 
Corporation is an operating and holding o.ompany owning 100~ 
interest in twenty-two companies and less tb.an 1002' in two 
other firms. 
~he company and its subsidiaries are engaged in the 
manufacturing of passenger autQmobiles which are sold under 
the trade mmes of Plymouth, Dodge, . DeSoto, and Chrysler; 
commercial cars and trucks, sold under the trade name of 
Dodge. Also automobile parts and accessories are produced. 
194:0 
23.7~ 
1940 
9.7'/J 
Schedule at: Chrysler .cars to Total. 
Resis:tered in united stitet:J 
1941 
24.2~ 
1946 
25.7~ 
1947. 
21.81$ 
1948 
21.5~ 
SchedUle of Dodge ~rucks to ~otal 
Registared in united States 
1942 
11.~ 
1946 
15.4~, 
1947 
14.4% 
1949 
21.~ 
1948 
ll•l~ 
1949 
12.~ 
Sehedll1e ,2! Chrysler Oars, 'rrucks, and Commercial Vehicles 
· (tilllt.s sold in illilllons} 
1940 1941 1946 19,47 1948 1949 1950 
1.0 1.0 .67 .94 1.0 r.a 1.3 
The · progrees of C·hrysle r since the war bas been 
quite strong. In 194., there was a great. diffic.uJ.ty in 
ret.urning to peacetime operation. Chrysler, o·n the other 
band did better .than the industry, for its !'ercentage of 
Total Registered in United States. As to its own produc- : 
tion., 194.6 was the low.est of the ten year period in car , 
manui'actur·ing. ~he produc:tic:n of ears in~reased and t .oday 
it is about twice the 1946 output. In 1948, the campany 
suffered a long labor dispute ba.t the production for the 
3(). 
year exceeded the preoeeding period. 'rhe pr oduc ticn of 
t.ruck.a drOp:f8d in 1947 and 1948 but began to make a come-back 
in 1949. However, the cutlook is quite good for the future. 
of .6 
1940 
2.47 
19•46 
2.74 
Schedule of World§ ea~ital Ratio 
(Source is MOody'·s Inves ors Service) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
5.14 2".19 1.89 l..'ls 
1947 . 1948 1949 1950 
2.34 2.47 3.05 2.45 
The working capital ratio in 1950 showed 
194.5 
2.4:0 
a deel.ine 
times which can be explained in part by the increase in 
inoo.~ taxes and the new Excess Profits Ta.x. Although 2•45 
~ considered a good working capital ratio, the 3.05 t~es 
in 1949 is much better. If there was no new Excess Profits 
Tax, the ratio would bave been increased to 2.65 times. 
31. 
Schedule ot ~!:.!!! lrarketable Seeurities. (in millions) 
{Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1940 1:941 1942 19<l5 1.944 19-!5 
cash $'109.1 $60.5 t8·'1.5 $105.1 ta6.7 $1.3'1.4: 
Mk. Sac. a.o 9.S .OG.Q a6.rz 87.6 38.3 
'fot;al $117.1 t«9.8 ts7.5 $1!1.8 $154.3 $175~'1 
1946 194'1 1.948 1949 1950 
Ca.sh $107.2 1139.5 • 99.3 11.57.5 tl25.6 Mk. Sec. 3a.s 76.6 l.Q:a.a. 165.4 22:1.0 
'rot.al. t1!9.f $216.1 t201.1 t.S22.9 t$46.6 
~e cash position c£ Chrysler corporation baa been 
quite good. During the w.ar, it was low considering the 
amounts in cash and marketable securities today bu.t, since the 
company was on war work and the Federal Government was ita 
debtor, the cash position did not need to be as strong as 
today. With almost a total. o-r $34'1 million in cash and 
Marketable Securities, Chrysler Oorporati_on is in an excel-
lent cash situa.tion.. It no Excess Pl"oti ts Tax was in etfect, 
the cash would be increased by over $15 million. 
Schedule .2!,_ Net Prdf:rty Assets (in millions) 
. (S011ree is Moo 's Investors Service} . 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944. 1.945 
$63 $58 $55 $51 $48 $71 
194:6 1.94'1 1.948 1949 1950 
$85 $103' 1149 112'1 $1.69 
~ Ohrysler Corporation is steadily on the in-
crease in plant and equipm.ent • After the war, an expansion 
program oom.menoed and now the assets have tripled. It is true 
to say that the oost of the assets in 1950 is more than the 
cost in the early forties but the over-all cost dif'f'erential 
1s not that great. If an Exc.eas Prof'i ts· 'fax was in ef'f'ect 
during th.is period of' growth, it goes without saying that 
Chrysler would not have been able to expand out of' earnings. 
The company has no f'unded debt today and has not bad any 
over the period studied. The expansion bas resulted f'rem 
reinvested earnings and was. made possible by the reduction ef' 
i t;s tax burden. 
1940 
$744 
1946 
tS'lO 
Schedule of Sales (in millionsf 
(Source is Moody's InvestOrs Serv oe) 
194.1 1942 1943 1944 
$888 $623 $886· $1,09.8 
194'1 1948 1949'; 1950 
tl,362 $1,568 $2,084 $2,190 
The sales of' Chrysler Corporation have 
1945 
1994: 
increased 
over 2 1/2 times the sales in 1946. This is considerably 
better than most of the companies in the industry considering 
they ba.d a strike in the first few months of the year. In 
1948 when Chrysler had the worst strike in its history, it 
was able to increase its sales owr the preeeeding period. 
These increased sales means an increa.se in profits and with 
an Excess Profits Tax, the percentage of earnings going to 
the Government would be great. Since the Excess Prof'i ts Tax 
was repealed in 1945, Chrysler was able to increase its pro-
d~tion capacity and hence increase it s sa1ea 1n volume and 
in dollars. 
Sche dul.e of Income 
{Source iBIMoody's 
1.940 1.941. 1.942 1.943 1944 1.945 
$1.6.5· $17.7 t22 t21.8 $22.8 t20.6 
1946 1947 1948 1.949 1950 
tl4.2 151.3 t55.5 $81 1107.5 
The taxes pa·id by Chrysler Corporation were high 
considering the charges made before the war and the income 
earned during the war. In 1947 men the sales of Chrysler 
Corporatio.n began to sa:lr upward, so did the taxes, and in 
1947, they were about four tines the charge made in 1946. 
35. 
In 1.950, when the new tax rate was errected, the expense took 
· ano·tber skyward jWilp although the sales only increased a 
little over tlOO million. In its expansion program the 
hi.E'Jler taxes have been of hindranee but all companies have 
been so effected by the increase in the normal and surtax 
rates. 
Schedule of EXcess Profits faxes (in millions) (Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1940 
$7.0 
1.950 
tJ.5.5 
1941 
tll.O 
1942 1943 
110.8 
1945 
•• 136 
'fhe EXcess Profits Tax that was paid by Chrysl.er 
Corporation during the war, was quite heavy, and the tax 
paid in 1950 was not far from the highest paid in 1944 or 
$23 million. Sinee the tax ts: for only one-balt' o-r a year, 
to put it on a comparable pasis, we shou.ld double that tax 
and the company wwld have bad an expense of $31 million or 
a little more then $7 million of the amount paid in 1944. 
This tax is q)U.ite severe 1f we take into consideration the 
expansion program of Ohrysl.er Oor·poration. They certainl.y 
would not have been able to progress as rapidly as they did 
if an ncess Profits Tax was in effect during the 18tter 
part of the forties. 
have 
Schedule of Eamings Per Share of Common 
(SOO.rce Ii MoOdy' a Investors Se:rT.lce·) 
1940 1941 1942 1945 1.944 1945 
$4.345 .4.61 $1.785 $2.68 $2.65 $4.305 
1946 1.947 1948 1949. 1950. 
$3.09 $7.72 IJ,0.25 115.19 $14.'11 . 
'rile earnings per share of Chrysler Corporation 
suffered by the Excess Profits Tax. During the 11ar, 
they dropped considerably but this was not abnormal because 
the contracts 111 th the Go"Zernment were on a cost-plus. basis 
therefore the eamings rema 1ned sma 11. Also, the taxes were 
large during this era, yet the eomp1.ny earned a comfortable 
margin or profit. In 1950 with the new enactment of an 
Excess Profits Tax, the net earnings per share fell. This 
woul.d have been much grea tar though if the :fu.ll effeet of the 
Excess Profits Tax was experienced. 
Schedule of Dividends. Paid Per Share of C.OJIDlOn Stock (SOiree is Moody's InVestor& Service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 19'45 
$2.'15 $3.00 $1.75 $1.50 .1.50 $1.50 
1946 1947 1~48 1949 1950 
$1.50 $4.00 $4.00 $5.25 $1.'15 
The dividend policy bas been a conservative one :ror 
Dl()St of. the earnings are reinvested in order to meet the ax-
_pansion needs ar· the coJD.pany. In the past ten years, they 
nave paid to the Stockholders about 42.~ at earnings in 
dividends, the balance going back into the business. .Uso 
in 1950, the par value of the stock was increased to $25, per 
share. No·w that the Com,Iany is. taced with an Excess Profits 
Tax, the amount of dividends reeei ved by the stockholders 
aJ;la.ll probably be reduced if the management wishes to con~ 
tinue to expand tbrcugn reinvested earnings. 
Schedule: at; Income, Inco.me Taxes, and Excess Profits Taxes 
- · ;per 1100 of Sales 
(Sonrce is MooiY'S InTestors Service) 
1940 1941 1942 1945 1944 1945 
Income $5.08 $4.52 t2.-t9 t2.65 t2.ae .3.77 
Taxes 2.22 1.99 3.52 2.45 2.0'1 2.0'1 
E.P.T. .94 1.24 1.!2 2:.13 .01 
(E.P.T. cr.). ( .11) 
1.946 194:7 1948 1949 1950 
tncome $3e09 $4.93 $5.69 16.34 15.80 
Taxes .1.63 3.'16 ~.~ . 3.89 4.98 
E.P.T. .'11 
(E.P.T • . er.) (.98) 
Dur-ing the war, the Excess Profi.ts Tax and Inoome 
Taxes acccunted for more tm_, n the incOJDe per $100 o:r sales. 
35. 
Under the mw Excess Pro:fi ts Tax Law, the effect is not sb.ow·n 
too clearly because only one-half of' the year was affected, 
and the Excess Profits Tax credit was extremely good because 
af the prosperons years of' the late forties. It the figures 
were adjusted, to reflect the fUll Excess Profits Tax, the tax 
would increase fran $.71 to abcnt $1.42 and the income would 
be reduced to ~bout $5.09. This is a substantial decline from 
the previous year's income of $6.34 even though the sales in-
creased over a hundred million dollars and the expenses in-
creased in proportion. 
Another interesting incolQe factor is the t unlike 
36. 
most automobile companies, Chrysl.er manufactures and assem-
bles its product in Detroit and Ships out its finished product. 
Althongh this adds to the eost of' production, it lessens the 
headaches ot mamgement in relation to labor and operating 
problems away from its home grounds. 
Chrysl.er Corporation is considered as one or- the· 
Big Three in the automotive industry and because of its fine 
management, it will remain there a good many years. '!he 
president and officers of the company are always searching for 
new ideas and ways to further develop the Chrysler line. They 
are know to be the first in liBD.Y new improTement s e:.nd the in-
tentions of management is to retain this position. 
fte plant is a c1osed affair as far as the general 
public is concerned. Since there are many processes carried 
on in the plant that are not p~tentable, the management has 
taken steps to prevent these improvements from falling into 
the possession or.· their C0111.pet1tors. The ac:tual management 
1a carried on within the plant itsel.:C, not only as a money-
saving device but al.so in. a way that. enables top management 
to view the progresses and deTelopments of producticm.. 
Also., the management is always trying to reduce 
expenses in order to increase the profits of' the corporation. 
It bas be ell their policy to standardize as much as possible 
between the different types. For exam.ple, the engine in the 
Dodge trock is the same as the one in a Plymouth. .Accordi.ng 
to this process, t .he Ghrysler Corporation has made a prof'i t 
or $66 on its Plyma1th while General Iotors Corporation bas 
made $33 on its Chevrolet and Ford Corporation t5. Another · 
consideration is tba t all dealers handle Plymouth cars at a 
232b discount while the other au tom.obile companies sell their 
cars at a 25% discount to their respective dealers, thus 
gi~ing a greater profit to Chrysler Corpoxstion. 
The ove»all effect ot an Excess Profits Tax on 
Chrysler Corporation is. an interesting one. A tax of' this 
nature will not effect the company to the extent of endan-
gering its position in the industry because it is subst~­
tially large and tully developed. It is true that the com-
pany is continuing to grow year after year but llith the 
eco-nomies and progressiveness ot mnagement and the excel-
lent over-all fiXLancial position its company enjoys, an 
EXcess Profits Tax would have to be heavier than anticipated 
3'1. 
to uproo't i'ts standing in the industry~ 
The Excess Profits Tax will without doubt, curtail 
the expansion program or Chrysler Corporation along civilian 
production lines but the company ia looking forward to long 
ter.a Government contracts to offset any decline in regular 
business. 
I would not want to leave the iapression that 
Chrysler will not be affected by an Excess Profits Tax but 
I wou1d likB to stress that their posi tioo. at the present 
time is a m.os t favorable one in comparison to the other com-
panies in 1he industry. The Chrysler Corporation shall be 
able to earn about $9 per share of common stock before the 
EXcess Profits Tax is effected. 
sa. 
Chapter· III 
Chemical Industry 
1. Heyden C.heJlical Col])oration 
The Reyden Chemical Corporation was incorporated 
in Delaware, March 13, 1943 as the result of a merger of the 
Denhey liolding Corporation (a Delaware Corporation) and the 
Heyden Chelllical Corporation (a New York Corporation). The 
original Heyden Chellical. Corporation of New York was incor-
porated in New York, November 1, 1935 aa the result of a oon-
so1idatiQn between the Heyden C·hsical Company of America, 
Incorporated {incorporated in :Ne-.· York in 1919) and the 
Denhey Corporation (incorporated in New York in 1925). In 
].926 the Heyden Chemical Corporation, (a New York corporation) 
acquired the assets and business at Nowell Chemical Corporation. 
In 1947, the Heyden Chemical Oorpomticn ( a Delaware cor-
poration) acquired over 99% at the common stock at NY&l Com-
pany, a drug distributor. In 1948, Rumford Chemical. Works of' 
Rum.tord, Rhode Island, was purchased and is operated as a 
diviSion or tbe company today. 
The com.pt.ny is ohie:tl.y an operating concer:n but aa 
Gf' late, it is al.SO a holdi:og company with leas than 10~ in-
terest in some subsidiaries• Some of' the manufactured pro-
ducts or the company are formldehyde and its dertvati"f'es 
para:Cormalde-hyde, hexamine and penta.eryehritol tor use in 
the m.anuf'acturing of plastica, rubber and industrial finishes, 
penic.il~in, streptomycin, sal.icyl.a tes, gt_ycerophospha tea and 
other medicinal..s, a number or eoal tar chemical.s. for use as 
dyestuff' intermediates, food ah.emical.s, and flavorings. 
Schedule ot Cash and Jlarketabl e Secur:l. ties (in millions) 
1Source ~MoOdy's Investors Service} 
1940 1941 1942 ~943 1944 l.9-i5 
Oash $.44 $1.9 •• 9 $2.2 t2.9 $4.1 
Mk. Sec. 
-- --
.... -
-- --T-otal. t:ii ·~ t:r tr.T IT.O" $4.'! 
19,& 194.7 19-iS 194:9 1950 
Cash $3.5 $5.5 $2.5 t3.8 .,.1 
Mk. Sec. .1 .1 
Total ·~ $r.o ·~ $!":'§' t'CT 
'fhe. over-al.l cash position is an impreasi ve one and 
bas increased abcmt ten times sime 1940. 'J!be war helped 
Heyden Chemical Corporation for it was during this period 
that the company began to progress. The effects of' the heavy 
taxes and especially the Excess Profits Tax did lead to some 
curtailment, bu. t their cash balances during the eo nf'lict were 
in an impressive state. 
1940 
1.5 
1946 
2.72 
Schedule at. Working Capital Ratioa 
(Source is iiOo(iyis Investors Seriice) 
1941 1942 1943 19.(4 
2 1.57 .3 2 
194.7 1948 1949 1950 
5•25 4•1 5.24 3.5 
1945 
2.36 
fte working oapi tal ratio has been excellent 
through the years. What makes a more. illlpl!essive picture is 
40. 
'the tact that of the total. current asseta, cash makes up· 
almost om-halt of it.. The ef'fect of' the increased taxes 
ani Excess Profits Tax has shown to a small degree because 
ot the fact that the sal.e s tor the year were in accordance 
with previous years and the Excess Profits Tax credit was 
good. 
1.940 
$6.0 
1946 
tl.a.s 
Schedule of' Net sales (in millions) 
(Source is Moody's InvestOrs Serv~oe) 
l94l. 
.9.5 
~94'1 
tat.9 
1942 
tll.l 
1i48 
$24.9 
1943 
114.2 
1949 
$26.1 
1.9« 
$16.-i 
1950 
$26.6 
~945 
$.1'1.1 
i'he net sales over- the period have increased over 
six times. During the latter f'ortie s, the company began to 
expand its facilities in order to •eet the demand of the 
times. Because of' their expansion program and the improved 
business conditions, the sales have shown a marked inorease. 
Since the end of the war, the sales have increased about 
1 1/2 times and for a oo.mpany ot its size, this is an excel.-
lent record. f'or the competition in the chemical industry is 
keen. 
Schedule of Net 
(Source is Moody's 
194D 194:1.. 1942 1945 1944 1945 
t.s $1.0 $.709 t.ao& $.968 11•40 
1946 1947 1948 1949· 1950 
12.4 t2.'1 $2.9 $1.5 .2.2. 
41.. 
The effect of the high taxes during the war 
affeeted the c cmpanies to a great degree for although the 
sales: more than do.ub~ed, the income remained about the same. 
The Excess Profits Tax e.ccoun ted for a substantial. part of 
the taxes and the profits of the company were held to a 
minimum. by the Excess Profits Tax. 
42. 
Schedul.e .2f.. IncOllle ~ Excess Profits Tax Paid( millions) 
(Source is Moodyt s Investors ServiOif 
1940 1941 ~942 ~943 1944 1945 
Income $.32 •• 44 $.337 $.412 $.432 $.455 
E.P.T. .22 .as 1.636 1. '11.8 2.0 2.45 
1940, 1947 1948 1949 1.950 
Income $1.5.'1 $1.64 $1.84 $1.13 $1.99; 
E.P.T. . 06'1 
'!he income taxes paid by Heyden Ghem.ioal Corporation 
have increased over the years, but this is understandable 
because of the increase in sales. The inoane taxes. increased 
about si.x times since 1940• The Excess Profits Taxea, during 
the war, were quite heavy bu "t in this span of years the com-
pany was able to increase its sales irrespective at taxes 
beeause of the demand brougllt upon the com.pany by the Govern-
ment. In 1950 with the emctment of a New Excess Profits Tax 
the full effect has not been felt because the tax was for only 
a half a year. If the tax was taken on the full ca~endar year, 
it would have amounted to about $.134 million• 
1940 
•• '185 
~946 
$1.81 
Scb.ed ule ~ Eamin.gs ~ Share .2f Common 
(Source is Moodyts Investors Service) 
~941 1.942 1943 1944 1945 
•• 904 •• 596 . $.656 •• '14 $1.056 
1.94'1 1948 1.949 1950 
$2.01. $2.03 •• 91. $1.8.'/ 
The earnings per share of common stock of Heyden 
Chemical has about doubled since 1940. The reason for the 
43. 
small increase in respect to the increase in sales and net 
income is because of the .expEil.se involved in new financing 
for expansion. The sharp increase in 1950's profit per share 
over 1949 was brought about in part by the reacquiring of 
225 ,.ooo shares of common stock by the company, and thus in-
creased the earnings per share ot the stock. outstanding. 
lg4(l 
$.:30 
1.946 
$e86 
and have 
Sche.dul.e _ ~Dividends Paid per Share 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1.941 19.42 1945 1944 
•• 30 $.30 •• 31.5 $.32 
1.947 1.948 ~9-49- 1.950 
$1.00 #1.00 $1.00 $..80 
The dividen.ds of the company have been 
averaged about 4~ of earnings over the 
1945 
•• 40 
quite good 
years 
studied. In 1949, al thau:gh the profit per share of canm.on 
stock was only $. 91, a stamard di viden.d of $,l.OG was paid. 
The di vide.nd would bave been greater if no Excess Profits 
Tax was i n effect and now the po1ie:y of the company may be 
changed. 
Scm dule of Income- and Taxes per $~00 .£!. Sa~es 
(Source is Moody's Investors SerVice} 
1940 1941. ~942 ~943 ~944 ~945 
Income $l.3 .33 $10.52 t 6.59' • 6.0:8 • 5.9.0 • 8.23 
'faxes 5.34 4.64 3.40 2.90 2.63 2.66 
E.P.T. 3.66 9..27 14.74 12.10 ~2.19 14.39 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950-
Incan.e $12.77 $12.33 $11.80 • 5.72 • 8.63 
Taxes S.35 7.51 7.40 4.35 7.50 
E.P.T. .as 
~axes ba ve played a Si gnifi cant part in the profit 
picture :ror Heyden Chemical Gompany. 1lhe tax expense has 
only been a :raw dollars under the net inaome figure so that 
a substantial increase in taxes at this time may prove :fatal 
to the company. Since an Excess Profits Tax removes those 
extra dollars earned by the company, the earnings of Heyden 
Chemical will suffer tremendously for the toll now is heavy. 
The cost of manufacturing are high to the company 
and the decrease in profits in 1949, were caused part~y by an 
increase of over $2,000,000 .in cost of goods sold a~one. 
Schedule of Net Plant and EQMitment (in millions) 
(sou:rcers MoOdy~Inves ors Service) 
1940 1941 ~9-42 1943 1944 1945 
$3.27 $3.96 $4.8 $5.0 $5..3 .6.34 
~945 1947 1948 1949. 1950 
$10.35 $11.3 114.8 $14 .9 $12 .• 3 
The growth of the company has been spasmodi e. 
During the war, the full growth value of property can not 
be estimated because of the lenient depreciation charges 
44. 
perm.i tted by the Federal Government. It appears through past 
history tbat the company bas expanded through borrowed capita1 
and reinvested earnings and when the funded debt was clear, 
the company would look for new expansion opportunities. 
The company also operates for the United States 
Army the government owned ammon!&: plant at Morgantown, West 
Virginia on a eo st-plus basis~ 
If an Excess Profits Tax 111as in effect during the 
times when Heyden Chemical Corporation was in the process of 
growing, it would bave cost · the company cons:t.derab1y more 
money. As it was, about 50% of the company's earnings were 
invested along with large sums of borrowed capital. 
Schednle .2!_ Funded Debt ( in millions) 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service} 
1946 1947 1948 1949 19.50 
Mortgage •• 656 •• 581 •• 506 $.431 
:Bonds 6. 6. 6. t5·.5 
'fhe funded debt o:f the company has not been too 
large in the past but since the war, when the company began 
to expand, this was accomplished in part by borrowing. This 
is where an Excess Profits Tax is felt the most. Now that 
an Excess Profits Tax is in effect the amount of money needed 
to expand will increase. This is quite troublesome to a 
small company for it is usually quite expensive to obtain 
borrowed capital and the fixed charges can completely wipe 
out a profit in a poor year. 
The runded debt of Heyden Chanical Corporation 
consists in a 4~ purchase money mortgage which was paid in 
1950 bu:t 11as not due until 1956. 'rhe mortgage was given 
($750,000) along with $310,000 in cash ror the acquisition 
or certain property aDd equipment at Memphi~Tennessee, 
which was romerly owned by the Defemse P1a.nt Corporation. 
The bonds of the company are 2 7/S's debentures, dated 
November 1, 1947 and ne:turi ty is November 1, 196£. They 
are callable arter October 31, 1950 and a sinking fund is 
provided for annual payments in order to redeem $250,000 
worth each year. They have an A Bating by Moody's Inves-
tors Service. ~he runds obtained from the sale of the 
securities were used in part to prepay a $2,000,000- bank 
loan given by tbe Bank of Manhattan in December, 1946. Also 
$1,300,000 was allocated for the expansion of facilities at 
the Pl:"inceton plant and the balance was added to w ortting 
capital. 
The effect of an Excess Profits ~ax on Heyden 
Chemical Corporation will be more harmful than other com-
panies because the company has a policy of reinvesting its 
earnings, in order to meet the demands of its customers, by 
expanding its facilities. If the company was pressed to 
expand and by this increase in development the profits were 
to increase substantially, which would be expected, the com-
pany may retard its growth because with the Excess Prorits 
~ax, the increase in profi. ts may be negligible and hence not 
profitable, from a financia1 view·po.int.. Those extra dollars 
that the Excess Profits Tax will now consume which could have 
gone to future expansion, now will go to the Government. 
Hence, an Excess Profits Tax now, when business is so good, 
would not be considered too favorable to the Heyden Chemical 
corporation. 
47. 
2.. Monsanto Cbe.mical. Ooml! ny 
The Monsanto Chemical C:o:at~n.y was incorporated in 
Delaware on April 19, 1933 to take over the assets and 
business of Monsan.to Chemical Works which was incorporated 
in Missouri in 1901. The Monsanto Chell:ical \fork:a was a 
small Corporation with a eapi tal of $5000 when it was original-
ly organized and was a caecharine producer. The offspring, 
Monsanto Chemical Company, bas grown so that today it is one 
o:r tbe leadin.g companies in the chemical industry. 
Monsanto Chemical Company functions chiefly as an 
operating company but as of December 31, 1950 the company 
ow ned 100% interest of vating stock in se"Veral col'porations. 
-.roday, some of the products manufactured by the company are: 
leave chemicals, coal tar intermediates, medicinals and fine 
chemicals, phosphorus and phosphoric acid compounds, plastics, 
plastieizers and solv-ents, rubber chemicals, tar acid chem-
icals, miscellaneous ch em.ical.s and many other product·•· The 
Company mintains plants and distri 1:u tion centers in the 
United States, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, India, Australia, 
am the British Isl.es. 
Schedule or cash and Marketable Securities (in IQ.llions) TSoU:rei' is _Moody's Investors Service) · 
1946 1.94:1. 1942 1943 1.944 1945 
Cash $6.5 $9.1 .,.,.,., $12.2 .9.95 $15.96 
:Mk. Sec. 1.9 1.1 2.« 8.91 
lfotal. . $6.3 tu;o $7.7 $13.! 1[2.!9 tia.s'l (Schedule continued on next page) 
Cash 
.a. Sec. 
T·otal 
1946 
t 8.99 
32.28 
tn·.l7 
1947 
$14.5 
$14.5 
1949 
$25.5 
2.'1 $26.2 
1950 
$28.7 
2'1.4 
tR:r 
'the cash and :tnarketab1e securities ot Monsanto 
Chemical. .Comrany have been increasing over the years. In 
1940, the total. of. mrketabl.e securities and cash was 16.3 
million while today it is $56.1 million, meaning over g 
tiaes greater today; and tbe total current assets being 
aboot $111 million is represented by over balt in eash and 
securities gi"Ying Monsanto a healthy cash positio-n. During 
the war, the total.s were low but a nice comeback was made. 
In JUly of 1950 1 a new stock issue of $3.85 diTidend series 
c preference stock of 150,000 shares no par was sold fer 
$15,000,000, and this transactim in pert accounts tor some 
of the increase in cash for 1950. 
1940 
2.6 
1946 
6.0 
Schedul.e o:t Wol'king Caii tal. Ratio 
(Source is BOody's fnves ors Service) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
3.'19 4.67 4.5 4.56 
1947 1948 . 1949 1950 
2,81 4.0 5.54 4.8 
1945 
6.15 
~he working capital ratio was considerably higher 
during the war per-iod than most: other eoapallies and continued 
to inere~se to this day. The ratio/ in 1950 dropped off 
al.igb:tl.y beeause of the substantial increase in taxes. All 
Excess Proti ts Tax of over 14 million took its toll on the 
ratio and redu oed the new working oapi tal. 
1940 
$51.1 
1946 
$.111.4 
Schedule of Net Sales (in millions) 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1941 
$70.2 
1947 
$156.4 
1942 
$77.0 
1948 
$.180.0 
1943 
$.90.1 
1949 
$183.9 
1944 
$96.1 
1950 
$249.0 
1945. 
$104.3 
The net sales of Monsanto have been on the up-
swing sino e the early forties • Through the fine and pro-
gressive accomplishments of management the company ha.s been 
able to increase its sales by almost five times. The efforts 
of. management in attaining this mar-ked growth will now be 
curbed by the enactment of a new Excess Profits Tax. In 
order to increase its sales, new facilities had to be added 
and this meant expansion which we shall see later was brought 
about partly through reinvested earnings and new capital. 
However, the improved conditions were chiefly effected by 
the efflci:ency of management. 
1940 
15.8 
1946 
$10.6 
Schedule of Net Inco.me (1n millions) 
{SOUr4Ce is Moody' s Investors seffice) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
$6.'1 $5 .• 4 $5.2 ts.o 
1947 1948 1949. 1950 
$16.0 $18,5 $.17,2 $2&.6 
The income, as the sales, has increased 
1945 
ts.e 
oYer the 
50. 
period tor Monsanto Chemical Company, but te a greater degree, 
for · they increased over five times. This goes to prove t .o 
some extent the contention. made about the efficiency and 
excellence of mana:geme nt. The expenses have been decreased 
per un1 t allowing for greater profits even though the taxes 
were increased. The Excess Profits Tax accounted for over 
#4 million of the tax expense for the period and if no such 
tax was in effect, the net profits to surplus would have 
been over $30 million. Again, i .t seems dif:t'icul t to believe 
that a company like Monsanto Chemical should be penalized 
because of the profici.ency of man~ement. 
Schedule at Income Taxes & Excess Profits Taxes. (in millions) 
-(Source is Moo:(fyi s Investors Service) -
19~0 1941 1942 1943 1944. 1945 
Income $3.4 #4.5. $4.1 $3.9 $3.4 $4.3 
E.P.T. 1.2 6.5 8.3 a.o 8-.4 7.9· 
1946 194'1 1948 1949 1950 
Income $8.4 tll.4 . $11.'7 112.1 $25.4 
E.P•T• 4.a 
file taxes paid by Monsall to Chemical. Company have 
been extremely high in 1950, and have increased o-ver six 
times since 1940. But if no Excess Profits Tax was paid in 
1950 the inerea se would llave been only a 11 ttle over five 
times. ~he tax expense bas been a detriment to the company 
in its expansion plans and hall accounted for a good per cent 
ot pro:fi ts. During the war years, the E;x:cess Profits Tax 
amounted to more than double the regular sur and normal tax 
although today under the new Excess Profits Tax it accounted 
tor only about 13%. Since, under the new .law, Monsanto 
Chemical Company bas a considerably good Excess Profits Tax 
cred.i t, the Excess Pro.fi ts Tax, if figured on a full year's 
basis, would be close to $9 million_ ~nd their net income 
would have been reduced by an amount equal to the added sum.. 
'fhe $9 million Excess Profits Tax would increase the total 
tax well over #35 million thereby making this expense quite 
si-gnificant. 
SChedule. ot Earnings Per Sha.re of Common Stock 
(source is Moody'S"'nvestorsSerVice} 
1940 
$1.44 
1946 
$2.53 
1941 
tl.62 
1947 
$3.70 
1942 
$1.22 
1948 
$4•08 
1.943 1944 1945 
$1.18 $1.11 $1.24 
1949 1950 
$3.75 $.5.45 
The income of Monsanto Chemical Company during the 
war was quite low as was that of many companies, but the 
recovery in 1946 has e.an.tinued until, today, the earnings are 
almost tour times greater. The earnings would have been in-
creased around a dollar a share if no Excess Profits Tax was 
1n effect in 1950. The Excess Profits Tax takes a heavy toll 
on earnings per share and the effect is quite substantial in 
the case of M:on.santo. 
Schedule of Dividends Per Sbare of Common Stock 
(Sour""'"Ce is Moody'SinvestorF'"Service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
11.00 $1.00 $.75 $.'15 $.'15 •• ~5 
19-'6 194'1 1948· 19'49 1.950 
$1.~5 $2.00 $2.00 $2.00 $2.&2 1/2 
52. 
~e dividend policy o·f the company has been a con-
servative one which reinvested about 43%of all earnings. 
Even though the company had a large Excess Profits Tax ex-
pense during the war, they were able to distribute part of 
their earnings in the way of dividends. Since the war, a 
greater percentage of earnings has been retained in the 
business in order to facilitate expansion and. lessen the 
need for new capital. With the new Excess Profits T·a::z::, 
however, this may prove quite diffieul t and new funds may be 
obtained through borrowing or reducing the dividends. 
Schedule .2! Income ~Taxes ~ $100 of Sales 
(Source is Moody's In'lfestors Servi ee) 
194:() 1941 1942 1943 19.(4 1945 
Incom.e $12.56- $10.62 $ 7.9'8 • 6.50 t 5.84 • 5.5'1 
~axes '7.69 15.07 15.91 13.07 12.90 ll.44 
Total. $20.27· $25.69 t23.89 $19·.57 $18.74 $17.61 
.1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Income $10.12 $10.85 111.16, tl0.39 $11•51 
T'axes 6.46 7.10 6 .• 2'1 6.51 12.22 
~otal $16.58 $17.95 $11.43 $16.90 $23~73: 
AI. though the efficiency of the company has in-
creased, the actual dollar gain bas not been too great. 
The efficiency as represented in dollars between 1949 and 
l95G was about seven dollars which the Income advanced only 
a little over one dollar, the balance being taken up in 
taxes and Excess Profits Tax accounts for a little over 
$1.80. It is clear to see that although management through 
their efforts have reduced expenses, their labors have been 
55. 
in vain because of the tax program. With the new Excess 
Profits Tax in effect, those companies who can show progress 
as. the result or· good management will be greatly aff"ected. 
However, Monsanto Ohemical Company did show a ge.in and this 
can be considered better than other companies. 
Schedule of Funded Debt (in millions) 
(S~ee iS'M'oody' s Investors Service} 
Parent 
subsidia_ry 
Total. -
1946 
$30. 
$'36. 
1947 
tBo. 
.5 $36.5 
~948 
$30.. 
.5 
$'3o.O 
1949 
$30. 
.438 $30.438 
1950 
$30. 
.375 $30.375 
The funded debt of the subsidiary consist in ~ 
debentures of Monsanto (Canada} Limited,. dated November, 
1.947, and due $52,500 annut:1.11y each year from November 1, 
1951 to 1957. The bonds of the present consist in 2.55% 
debentures dated November 1, 1946 and maturing November 1, 
1971. They are callable commencing November 1, 1951. and a 
sinking fund is provided which requires $1,000,000 per 
year from May 1, 1957 until 1971. ~he debentures ot the 
company represent about 16% of" total capitalization which is 
a comfortable margin. Also, the money received through the 
sale of the debentures, which are all privately held, was 
for expansion purposes. 
In order to provide funds for several major pro-
jects, the co~pany sold a new iss~ of preference stock. 
The 150,000 shares of series C. cumulative preference stock 
54:. 
went to 17 purchasers at a price of $15,000,000. The new 
issue has no conversion rignts and the dividend is $3.85 per 
annum. 
Schedule of Net PrO];lerty (JE. milliOl:l.S) 
(source is MoodY's Investors ·service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$50· $58 $54 $67 $'11 $74 
1946 19:47 1948 194:9 1950 
$97 $132 $165 $177 $192 
The net property ha s increased over the span of' 
years. covered by al.m.E>st tour times. Even though Mons an to 
Chemical c.o$.pany suttered a disastrous fire at its Texas 
City property in 1947, it has been able to expand its plants 
a.nd equipment. The increase in physical property was a.ocom-
plished through the reinvesting ot earnings and the sale of' 
securities. If there had been an Excess Profits Tax in 
effect during this period, it would have necess·i tated a 
greater outlay of new capital than was required. 
Schedule of Fixed Char~es attar· Taxes and DeTreciation (Sour-ce is Moo yi s Investors Service 
1946 
$58.01 
1947 
$19.54 
1948 
$22.03. 
1949 
$21.83 
The ratio of fixed charges times earnings is 
excellent. The certainty of their continued safety seems 
assured even though the Excess Profits Tax is in effect. 
55. 
~he over-all picture of Monsanto Chemical Company 
is a bright one except fo·r the tact that an Excess Profits 
Tax will be felt by them more than other companies. The 
Excess Profits Tax will confiscate some of those extra 
earnings which were made possible by the excellent and wise 
judgment of ma.nagement. True, the Excess Profits Tax will 
not be disastrous to Monsanto Chemical. Company but they will 
be forced to curtail some of their future plans in order to 
continue with their fine showing. 
56. 
3. ~ Chemical Company 
The Dow· Chemical Company was originally incor-
porated May 18, 1897 in Michigan and on JUne 11, 1947, it 
was incor-porated in Delaware to succeed the Mic-higan Com-
pany as to assets and busimss. 'fhe Dow Chemical Company 
functions oh.ief'ly as an operating company but over a period 
of" years, it bas purchased several subsidiaries owning 100% 
interest and others are owned with less than 10~ of" voting 
stock, thus :msking Dow Chemical Company also a holding com-
pany. 
The Company is engaged in the manufacturing and 
selling of organic and inorganic chemicals, also plastics, 
magnesium, magnesium alloys, magnesium fabrications, and 
about every known chemic~ that is manufactured. The pro-
duct distribution is as follows: Industrial Chemical 56%; 
Pharmaceutical. and Aromatic Chemicals 6~; Agriculture 
Chemicals ~; Plastic.s and related compounds 2~; and Mag-
nesium 7~. 
Schedule ot Cash ~ Marketable Securities (in millions) 
(Source is !lc;;>ody' a Investors SirnciT 
194:0 1941 1942 1945 1944: 1945 
Cash $5.3 $3.8 $5.2 $&.6 $14.1 117.5 
J4k. Sea. •2 .2 -- 2.3 16.8 22.8 
Total ~~ :Jr.tf tO: ttr.V tso.o $40.3 
1946 1947 i948 194:9 1950 
Caah. tl0.-4 $7.6 $10.4 111.6 $17.1 
J4k. Sec. 10.7 3.2 12.4 5.1 26.8 
'rotal $21.1 ' ~8 t22.a $16.7 $45.9 
57. 
• 
The cash posttion of" Dow Chemical Company has im-
proved considerably since 1940 to the extent of increasing 
about 8 times. During the war the cash was low, but towards 
the end of the fighting in 1945, cash and securities were 
high and represented a.bou.t 58.9~ of current assets. In 
1946, and tae return to peace, the company began expenditures 
for expansion and in that year spent about $18,000,000 for 
new plant and equipment. The cash and marketable securities 
p.osi ticn have steadily increased since that time and in 1950, 
it attained its highest mark. With the coming of the Excess 
Profits Tax, which will affect the company at the end of its 
fiscal year, May 31, 1951, the cash position will be affected 
to a c.onsiderabl.e degree. 
1940 
3.1 
l9-i6 
4.01 
over the 
able for 
analysis 
Schedule of. Working Catital Ratios 
(Source is MoOdy's InTes ora Service) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
1.29 1.49 1.16 2.64 
1947 1948 1949 1950 
2.2-i 2.86 2.43 2.44 
The working capital ratio has been quite 
years. ift.at it was low during the war is 
all c~panies were in the same position. 
1945 2.« 
steady 
understand-
With an 
or the content of net assets, which is mostly cash, 
one finds this ratio substantial. Since Excess Profits Tax 
will be paid in 1951, the ratio w.ill probably be lower but 
the over-all picture as far as the working capital ratio is 
ean.cerned is excellent. 
~940 
#37.7 
~94:6 
~~0~.6 
Schedu~e of Net Sa1es (in mi~~ions) 
(Source lslio;dyts Investors Service) 
~94~ 
$46.9 
~947 ~948 
·~30.4 $1.70.6 
1943 
·~05.4 
~949 
$200.3 
~944 
$120.4 
1950 
$220.8 
1945 
-~24.5 
~ sa~ea or Dow Chemical Company have increased 
oyer five times since 1940, and have more than doub~ed since 
~946. 'fhis increase in sales was bro.ught a:bcnt by the ex-
pansion of. taci~ities sime the end ot the war in order to 
meet the demands brought upon the company by its customs. 
It an Excess Profits Tax was in effect during this period it 
1a hard to conceive how the oom.pany coul.d do: so well without 
the blrden of increased debt borrowing. During the war, the 
EXcess Profits Tax, as we shall see later, took a substantia~ 
ptrt ot earnings. Although the sal.es during the war were 
sma~l as compared with today because ot the controls, the in-
come earned was minute. The large upward trend of sales 
detini tel.y :m rks the growth of the cpm.pany in aize and pop-
ularity. In a nine month comparab~e period,. from. May 31., 
1.950 to February 28, ~951, with the same period, 1n the pre-
ceeding years the sales increase from 1154.7 mil~on in ~950 
to $240.7 lllillion which is considerable. It the trend ot 
sa~es tor the year ccntinue, the net sales at the end of the 
fiscal year shoul.d reach $325 million which would be better 
tba-n 8 times the sales in 1940. 
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1940 
$7.1 
194:& 
.6.7 
Schedule at Net Profit (in millions) (Source isJioody's Investors serVice) 
1941 
17.7 
1947' 
$12.'1 
1942 
$9.4 
1948 
$21.0 
1943 
$9.5 
1949 
125.2 
1944 
IJ.o.s 
1950 
$33.8 
1945 
111.0 
The profits from 1940 to 1950 have increased about 
five times which is quite good. During the war, the net in-
come tor the ccmpany was small but this is understandable 
&0. 
because ot the high taxes, price controls, and Government con-
tracts which were on a ccst•p1us basis. The net profits have 
increased in a consistent proportion with the sa1es. It the 
t .rend of net income, after taxes, over the nine months con-
tinues $29.1 million in 1951 as compared with 122.& mill.ion 
in 1950, the net income tor 1951 should be about 140 mil.l.ion. 
Schedu1e o:r Income and EXcess Profits 'rax (in m.111ions) 
TSonrce is ""Moody~ s :rnvestors Sar"Yiee) 
1940 li4:1. 1942 . 1943 1944 1945 
Income 11.5 $1.9 J3..; f3.9 $3.9 $4.3 
E.P.T.. .04 6.1 1..(.8 10.1 11.9 
1g46 1947 1948 194:9 1950 
Income 13.1 ts.2 #12.4 $15.8 . t19.5 
E.P.!f". .099 
1'b.e Inecm.e Taxes have increased 15- times since 
19-10 and when the full. effect of the new 'tax law is effected 
in the 1951 report, the taxes shall show a tremendous advance. 
For just a nine month period, the taxes of 1950 as compared 
with 1951 are: 113.9 million to $4:5.4 milliaa. It this 
si-tuation. continues, the total tax at the end of the fiscal 
year ~951 shoold reach cl.ose to $60 million. 0~ this am.ou.nt, 
the new Excess Profits Tax will account ror a substantial 
part. 
Schedul.e or Proti ts and Taxes ~ $100 Bales 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
19-10 1941. 19~ 1943 194:4 1945 
Protits $18.97 116. 5? $11.77 • 7•87 t 7'.12: • 7.02 
~axes 4.05 4.26 12.85 1,.44 ll.&7 13.06 
19'46 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Prot:Lts • 6..83 • t.'16· t12.3<i t12.6·1 115.35 
Taxes. 2.01 6.29 '1.29 7.9·1 8.86 
EVen though the taxes w·ere high during the war, the 
Doa Chemical Company was able to n:eintain a high percentage 
of profit. in relation to $100 of sales. Alth ough the ca·st ot 
production increa~ed sinee the w:ar, the net profit has in-
creased t .o a greater degree. 
Schedule S!f. Earnings per Share of· CoJIUDan Stock 
(Source is Moody's Investors . Service) 
1940 1941 1.942 1943 1944 1945 
$1.66 $.1.64 $1.83 $1.85 12.05 $1.96 
1946 1947 1946 1949· 1950 
$1.10 $2.31 $3. '12 14.44 $5.73 
De earnings per share of common stock, as adjusted 
tor· the 4 to 1 spll t in 1948, have shown a marked improvement 
since 1940 with an increase of a li tt1e less than 5 1/2 times. 
under the new tax law, the cu:rrent earning power is around 
$5 a share while under- the old lew it was around $7 or tB a 
share. It the Excess Proti ts Tax is: in ettec.t, any great 
length ot.· time, it will de:finitely cause much concern and 
percentage ot proti ts to sales will decrease. 
Sch.edule ~ Dividends l!,!! ~ Share or Common 
(Source is Moodyts Investors Se~v!Ce) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$.75 #.75 •• 75 •• '15 •• '15 $.75 
1946 1.94:7 1948 1949 1.950 
$.75 •• 75 jl.75 $1.00 
lfh.e dividend policy ot Dow Chemical Company bas 
been a conservative one :ror they bave paid out about 38.7% 
ot earnings in cash di'Vi.dends. In 1949 and 1950 a stock 
dividend at one share for every 40 shares held was also 
declared. The conservatia:gt. ot the company in retaining 
eerninga ia to :facilitate their expansion program. The 
dividend Shall no doubt be increased now that the Excess 
Profits Tax is in eff'ect because the tremendous growth pro-
gram ~11 be about completed in 1951. 
1940 
t30.l 
1946 
16·7 ·" 
Schedule ot Net Profi:rty (in millions) 
(source iSlioody* s nvestoFS service) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
t59.5 $69.7 t77.3 #71.0 
194:7 1946 1949 1950 
114:5.2 $178.1 $200.8 $212.0 
1945 
t65.5 
!he expansion or· Dow Chemical Company has been ex-
ceeded by no other m .jor company in the industry• 'fhe net ' 
property was increased about seven till2s since 1940. In the 
sa. 
current fi.s. ca~ year, the com.pany has expended about $70 
million on plants and snotber $70 million is anticipated in 
the coming year. By the increase in facilities, it is not 
too unbe~evab~e to expect the. v~~ume of production to ap-
proach t400 million and in turn increase income. Al.so, this 
increase in income will be diminished quite substantially by 
an enduring Excess Proti ts Tax. 
1940 
$5 
19<&6 
0 
Schedule of Funded Debt (in millions) 
(Source isMoodyi s Investors Service} 
1.941. 1942 1943 1944 
114.2 .13.5 $12.7 $12 
1947 1948 1949 1.950 
165 #67.2 $5'1.2' 162.5 
1945 
111.2 
65. 
'fha debt of Dow Chemical Company is quite substan-
tia.! today tor it represents about 25% of its total capital-
ization. The debt consists in (1) fi.ft.een year . 2.35% deben-
tures. due November 1, ~961 - $27,5~7,000; (2) promissory 
notes, due J"anuary 1, 19"12 (annua·l payments beginning January 
~. 1953) - l35,ooo,ooo; (3) contracts and notes payable tor 
purchase or interest in oil and gas tields - tso,ooo. 
Schedule .2!_ Fixed Charges Earned after Depree:iat.ion ~ Taxes 
(Source is Moody's ;rnvestors Service) 
~940 1.941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
45•2 28.5 27.7 2'1•7 29.8 33.5 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
31.9 16.4 12.6 14.5 21.9 
The fixed charges earned is an impressive one al-
though the :t."unded debt represent; a abou:t 25% ot the capita~­
ization, the fixed charges are earned over 2~ times. An Ex-
cess Profits Tax can and will cause this ratio to decrease 
eTen though the tumed debt is reduced slightly each year. 
Since Dow Chemical Company has expanded by leaps 
and boo.nds since the war, an Excess Profits Tax wil~ play an 
important part in its future. Although the Excess Profits 
Tax credit will be good, the amount of tax will be greater 
tor now. Ohemicti Company because during the credit era, the 
company was building, The net results of the expansion will 
not show up unti~ possibly 1952 so that the tremendous in-
crease in sales will bear a he:avy tax burden thereafter. Also, 
si.nce the rate of expansion is greater· than that of any other 
major chemical firm, the other firms in turn will wi thout 
doubt be to a tax advantage because Dow. Chemical Company's in-
creased earnings and sales was e-ffectuated because of its ex-
pansion. 
It ~:~eems quite unfair to penalize such a ccmpany as 
Dow Chemical which has progressed so since the war. The com-
pany through its fine managemsnt bas increased its productive 
ca.paci ty and now l .ooks forward to increased. profits, but. their 
expectations I)lay be forlorn because the Excess Profits Tax 
will reap a great deal of those extra earnings which could go 
to the benefits of Dow Chemical Company. 
Chapter IV 
011 Industry 
1. Continen.tal Oil Compa,ny 
The Continental Oil Company was incorporated in 
Dela:ware on October a. 1920 as the Marland Oil Company to 
acquire, through the excl:ange of stock, control of Marland 
Refinin..g Corporation, and Kay County Gas Gompa:ny. The nam.e 
was changed from Marland Oil Company to the Continental Oil 
Company on January 26, 1929, and also at this time, the Con-
tinental Oil C:om.pany acquired the assets of Continental Oil 
Oom.J;El.ny (a Maine company) for a consideration of 2,317,266 
shares of s.to.ok• In 1922, the company aoquired controlling 
interest in the Tom cTames Oil Company, Kaney-cleary Oil Com-
pany and Francom Oil Company. At a later date, complete 
control was procured in these companies. In 1929, the com...-
pany acquired prope:rtie s of Pru den,tial Refining Corporation 
65e 
for consideration of stock in the com.pany. In 1938, the 
mexican Government seized properties of the companies' sub-
sidiaries in Mexico and not until 1943 was a s:ettl.emen t reached 
:Car in that year, the Mexican Government made its first pay-
ment to Continental Oil Company for the losses incurred b.y the 
company. 
Conti nen tal 0 il G ompany is chi efl.y an ope ra.t ing com-
pany but in later years, it has become a holding company, with 
six wholly owned subsidiaries and less than 10~ voting con.trol 
in six others, as well as interests .in other companies, shares 
of which are held joint ly with it.s present subsidiaries. 
66. 
The parent and subsidiary companies form a cro~l'ete 
unit in the oil industry, for they engage in producing, trans-
porting, refining and marketing petroleum and its prodmts under 
the trade name "Oonoco". Tb9 unit produces more crude oil than 
it is able to refine so they are a seller of crude oil. on 
the other band, they sell more gasoline than they can manufac-
ture, so they acquire gasoline from other companies. Since 
1935,. the company has not engaged in the transportatian. or 
dis tri bl.tien of natural gas but natural gas and residue gas 
are also sold at wholesale. 
The plants and lands of the company are in the rich 
oil terri tory of the south-western part of the United states 
as well as Mexico and Canada. The Canadian oil concess ions 
are held by an affiliate of Continental Oil Company in Canada, 
the HUdsonts Bay Oil & Gas Company, Limited. 
Schedule of Cash and Marketable Securities {in millions) 
~ource ~estors ServiceT 
1940 19'41. 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Cash. $12 .69· $20.36 $10.15 $18.97 $13.5 $20.2 
Mk. Sec. .11 .o1 .01 .01 1.8 2.4 
1946 1947 1948 1949. 1950 
cash $18•9 #.23.5 $15.2 t ·l7 .7 tl5·.2 
Mk. sec. .3 .25 .26.2 .20.2 .28.2 
The cash positicn of Continental Oil Company is 
quite im.pres sive and has increased over the per·iod. studied 
abont three am one-half times. Even thongh the company has 
carried on an extensive expansion program, the compa ny has 
never permitted its cash reserves to falter. The taxes of 
the company were high during the war, but the amount of cash 
has been maintained at a high level. 
1946 
2.10 
Schedule of Worki~ Ca¥ital Ratios (Source 1s MOody's ~ves ors SerVice) 
1941 
1.46 
1947 
2.06 
1942 
2.58 
~948 
2.22 
1943 
2.71 
1949 
2.38 
1944 
2.64 
1950 
2.58 
1945 
1.64 
The working capital ratio bas been excellent down 
through the years. It is even greater than the ratio shows 
f or at least 36% at the eurrent assets have been in cash. 
During most of the pe riod studied, the percentage of cash 
has been closer to 50% 
1940 
$84 
1946 
$159 
Schedule of Gross Sales (in millions) 
(Sooree isMoOdy's Invesmrs Service) 
1941 
$106 
1947 
$228 
1942 
1112 
1948 
$330 
1943 
#119 
1949 
$315 
1944 
$131 
1950 
#348 
1945 
$144 
The sale s ha. ve shown a remarkable trend over the 
eleven year span. The increase bas been over four times and 
since the end of the war, they have more than doubled. The 
increases in sales was brcugnt about by the continued fore-
si.ght or management in its development of property owned and 
the acquisition of DeW lands. The increase in the sale ot 
67. 
automobiles and other petroleum us 1ng mechanisms had brough_t 
about a great demand on the oil industry and in tum, con-
tinental Oil Company capitalized on the situation, and with-
out doubt, they shall continue with this progressive attitude. 
1940 
t~.3 
1946 
lt9. 
Selle dule of Net Income in millions 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
$15.3 $14 .. 9 $14.0 $12. 
1947 1948 1949 1950 
$31. $54. $36. 142.4 
1945 
$15. 
The net inccm.e ot Continental Oil company has in-
creased abcut ten times since the beginning e-r. the forties. 
.Althc:ngh the sales onl.y increased a 1i ttle over four times, 
the efficiency and techniques of mass production have re-
numerated the company tremendously. It must also be remem-
bered that a decline in sales Will show a great.er decline i n 
the percentage of profits. At this point, an EXoess p.rofi ts 
Tax does not seem to have any great effect on Continental Oil 
Company. 
Schedule of· Income ~ Other Taxes {in millions) 
. (Source Is Moody's Investors service·} 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$.37 $1.7 $3.1 t2.2 $.41 $1.2 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
t3.4 t9~2 $19.8 tl0.3 $15. 
'rhe taxes ot continental Oil Company were extremely 
small during the war in comparison with other companies. The 
68. 
amount at taxes paid in relation to taxable income was as low 
as 13% in some years where other companies were paying well 
over 50%. The Continental Oil Company made no provisions for 
Excess P.rofi ts T.ax during the war and this policy was also 
followed in 1950. Due to the nature . of' the properties of 
Continental Oil Gomp3.ny, they are permitted a large deduction 
for depletion and depreciation; the maintenance expenses are 
also quite large thus permitting a low tax expense. 
Schedule £! Earni! s ~ Share of Common Stock: (Sou:.rce is. Moo y~s Investors Service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 · ~944 1945 
$:.92 $3.29 $3.19 $3•00 $2.57 $3.23 
1946 .1947 1948 1949 1950 
14.05 .. 6.61 111.2:4 t7.48 ta.73 
'lbe earnings of the com.pany have been quite favor-
69. 
able over the per·iod of years and have increased over nine 
times since 1940. During the war; the income was held down 
because the chief customer or the Oontinen tal Oil Company was 
the United States Government and the contracts wer·e on a cost-
plus basis. Ala:>, the expansion possibilities of the company 
were · abridged, although they did invest funds in the pur-
chase of su.bsidimries. After hos.ti.lities ceased, tbe com-
pany began to increase its facilities and the results are 
shCJ'Kn in the profit figures. 
~9-'0 
$1.00 
~946 
~~.'10 
Schedule of Dividends J?aid pSr Share 
(Soarce is!loodyfs Investors eriice} 
~941 ~942 1943 ~944 
.~.00 $1.00 t~.oo $1.20 
~947 1948 ~949 ~95() 
$2.5() t3.50 t4.00 $5.00 
~945 
$1.60 
The Continents~ Oil Company ba s reimbursed its 
'10.. 
stockho~ders to the extent of about 43.~ in the way or· 
dividends over the la.st eleven years. Their policy has been 
quite <lOnservative far. the comp:tny bas accom.p~isb.ed some of 
its expansio-n thrcngh the use of reinvested earnings. Since 
the EXcess Proti ts Tax of Continental Oi~ Company have been 
negligible over the years, they have been in a better position 
to pay dividends than most companies. Another interesting 
feature to consider is that during the war when other com-
panies' income was great1y depl.eted by the Excess Profits Tax · 
and they would pay a sizable dividend, Continental Oil Com-
pany, whose Excess Profits Tax and other taxes were negligible, 
paid a dividend of ab01:1.t one-third of earnings which was much 
sma~ler than most of the other companies. 
Schedule of Profits and Taxes per $100 of sa~es 
(Sour-ce is Moody's :tnvestors Servi(i6) 
~940 1g41 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Profit. a $5.13 $14.45 $.13.26 $11.78 $9.12 #10.50. 
T'axes .44 1.60 2.'16 1.85 .31 .83 
1946 1947 1948 1949 ~950 
Profits $ll.94 #1.3.60 ~~6.42 #11.45 #12.18 
Taxes 2.24 4.04 s .• oo 3.30 4.32' 
The percentage of taxes. on the sale of $100 worth 
ot goods, to total income before taxes i s about 25% in 1950 ~ 
Thi.s is an extremely excellent margin. If we look back to 
the war era, the percentage of taxes was much low·er but today, 
the prices ef materials and labor have skyrocketed thus 
causing the cost of goods sold to increase with a net result 
of lower profits. If at some late!' date, an Excess Profits 
Tax is e.ffected and Continental Oil Company has to pay, it 
wilL cause a sharp decline in income. 
194.0 
$.73.0 
1946 
t1o9 .• o 
Schedule .2.f. Net Property (~ millions) 
(~ouree is Moody's Investors Service) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
$82.0 $.82.0·: $.82.29 $88.99 
~947 1948 1949 1950 
$119.0 $136.6 $152.5 $156•0 
1945 
$107.0 
Contineil tal Oil Company bas shown a marked increase 
in nat property assets over the period. The purcbases were 
accom.pl.isbed through retained earnings, with a limited amount 
of borrowed capital neec;led. The greater increase was in its 
investmnts in su. bsidiaries for the company has bongh t in-
terest in several companies in late years. The net plant: 
and equipment of Continental. has increased about 5~ since 
1940. 
1940 
$21.9 
Scbadule of Funded Debt (in millions) 
(Source is MoOdy's Investors SerVice) 
1942 1943 1944 1945 
$5.8 12.8 $1.5 $2.1 
{Schedule continued on next page) 
1946 
$1.1 
1947 
$.1.79 
1949 
$1.42 
1950 
$.40 
The funded debt has been greatly reduced since 
1940, and today it is about 1.8~ or the total debt in 
1940·. The company has fo.llowed an excellent financial. pat-
tern and this is further verified by the reduction of its 
debt. The capitalization of the company today is represented 
by about .15% in funded debt and the balance, 99.8~, in 
common stock a.nd surplus. 
Continental Oil Company can look forward t~o many 
good years far. the effect of an .Excess ;I'rofi ts Tax on the 
c.an..pe.ny· today is nil. As the eomp:l'ny continues to grow and 
profits increase, the Excess Profits Tax will without doubt 
begin to play an important part in its economy. However, an 
Excess Profits Tax far Continental Oil Company is not a sig-
nificant fac.tor at the present. 
72. 
2. Shell .Q.ll. c.ompany 
~he Shell Union Oil Corporation was incorporated 
in Delaware on February a, 1922 and on September 22, 1949 
the present name of Shell Oil Company was adopted. The com-
pany was organized to consolidate substantially all the pro-
perties of Royal Dutch-Shell and Union Oil Company (Delaware) 
in the mid-continent and California oil fields. The new 
company exchanged stock tor the Shell Company of California, 
Roxana Petroleum Corporation, Ozark Pipe Line Corporation, 
Matador Petroleum Company and also stook was given for a 
part interest in Union Oil Gom.,t:any of Cal.itornia which was 
later divorced from the unit. The Shell Oil Com,t:any since 
its formation bas purchased 100% ownership in about six com-
panies and also .bas interest in about five others. 
The Shell Oil Company is owned by Shell Caribbean 
Petroleum. Company to the extent of 65.44%. In turn, the 
Shell Caribbean Petroleum. Company is 100% owned by nutoh in-
terest. 
The Shell Oil Company functions chiefly as an 
operating and holding company and comprises an intergrated 
petroleum enterprise. The unit engag_es 1n the acquisi ti.on 
and development of oil and gas lands, in the production, 
purchase, sale, transportation and refinirg of orude oil, and 
transportatio:n and mrketing of its products, whi ab. are pl r-
ticularly gasoline, lubricating oils, fuel oil, and kerosene. 
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~so, the company manufactures and sells chemical products 
through itts subsidiary, the Shell Chemical Corporation and 
natural gas is sold as well. The Shell Oil C·ompany' s 
@perations in Canada are carried on by a 50% owned sub-
sidiary, the Shell Oil Company of Canada, Ltd. 
Schedu.le of Cash and Marketable Securities (in millions) 
TSource TSMoody' s Investors $ervic8T 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Cash $41.5 $30.8 $40.3 $41.8 $52.1 $48 .5 
Mk. See. 16.2 16.6 22.9 34.8 28.2 61.2 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Cash $37.7 $,39.'1 $54.1 $48.3 $48.5 
Mk. Sec. 98.1 40.2 34.7· 24.7 88.5 
The cash position of Shell Oil Gompany bas been 
good over the years. They have always maintai~ed a strong 
cash reserve that was in its lowest year about 30% of all 
current assets and increased to well over 50%. The cash 
reserves in some years, more than covered the funded debt, as 
for example, in 1945, the cash and marketable securities 
amoont ed to over $109 million while the funded debt stood at 
$81 million. The other current liabilities were about $61 
million and if they were reduced b.y the balance of cash, the 
lia bili ties against other current as.sets of about $98 million 
would be roughly $33 million leaving a balance of aurrent 
assets of $65 with all debts ot the company liquidated. This 
without doubt is an excellent situation for the company to be 
in. 
74. 
years 
1940 
3.85 
1946 
3.79 
Schedule of Working Ca;pi tal Ratios 
(Source i.s Moody's Investors Service). 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
2.76 2.39 1.88 2.54 
1947 1948 1949 1950 
2.10 1.91 2.34 2.32 
1945 
3.40 
The working capital ratio, although during some 
fell quite sharply, has been excellent when one con-
siders that a good portion of the current assets are in cash 
and marketable securities as was pointed out in the preceeding 
paragraph. The decline in 1943 was caused in part by the 
heavy Excess Profits Tax which amounted to over $14 million. 
The Excess Profits Tax took a heavy toll on the earnings of 
Shell Oil Company and because of this burden, the expansion 
program was not too extensive. 
1940 
$254 
1946 
$442 
Schedule of Sales (in millions) 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1941 
$300 
1947 
$628 
1942 
$329 
1948 
$830 
1943 
$407 
1949 
$.816 
1944 
$.489 
1950 
$911 
1945 
$475 
~e sales of the Shell Oil Company have increased 
some 3 1/2, times since 1940 and this is quite good for the 
company. The increase during the war· was quite nil but at 
the war's end, the sales doubled. The effect of an Excess 
Profits Tax on the company were quite severe and held profits 
down. Also, the sales in dollars did not increase too greatly 
75. 
because of the Government contracts of cost-plus. 
1940 
$15.6 
1945 
$32.8 
Schedule of Income (in millions) 
(Source is Moody's InveStors serVice) 
1941 
$17.3 
1947 
$59.8 
1942 
$16.8 
1948 
$111.3 
1943 
$24 .5 
1949 
#76.4 
1944 
$28.1 
1950 
$90.1 
1.945 
$28.7 
~he income of Shell. Oil Company have increased to 
a greater degree that sales for income of 1940 over 1950 is 
about six times while sales were only three and one-half. 
Since the greater percentage of profits can be attributed to 
higher prices, the cost of labor, etc., have increased also. 
The main reason for the better income percentage is because 
of the increased efficiency in production as accomplished by 
management. In part, these extra profits, which the policy 
makers of Shell Oil Company were able to effect, are con-
sumed by an Excess Profits Tax, and their loss will be felt. 
Schedule of Incom.e and Excess P:ro.fi ts Taxes (in millions) 
-rsource is Moody's Investors Servicif 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944. 1945 
Income $ 3.8 $ 9.9 $l.4.9 $ 8.3 $ 9,.9 $ 3.9 
E.P.T. 9.0 23.5 25.2 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Income t 9.2 $19.2 $40.6 $25 .5 $42.2 
E.P.T. 5.5 
The taxes of the Shell Oil Company have increased 
substantially since 1.940, to the extent of over 12 1/2. times 
and the Excess Profits Tax was over 13% of the total Govern-
ment tax paid. The taxes paid by Shell Oil Gompany amounts 
76. 
to ov er 34% of income before taxes am the Excess Profits 
Tax is about 4.1%. The 4.1% does not seem like a large 
figure blt one must consider that the tax would be dcubled, 
if the effect was for a msle year. 
1940 
$1.05 
1946 
$2.44 
steadily 
Somdule of' Earn~s ~ Share of Common 
(Source ISMood~ Investors service) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$1.32 $1.29 $1.82 $2.09 $2.14 
1947 1948 1949 1950 
$4.44 $8.27 $5.67 $6 .69 
The earnings per share of Shell Oil company have 
increased and are CJ¥er six times greater today than 
they were in 1940. If no Excess Profits Tax was in effect 
in 1950, the earnings per sha re would have risen over $.41 
which wcnld have increased the earnings to over $7.10 and a 
25.2% increase over 1949 rather than an 18.5% advance. 
Schedule of Dividends Paid ptr Share of Common 
(srurce is Moo.dyt s Inves ors Service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$ .75 $1.00 $1.00 $1.25 $1.50· $1..50 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
$1.50 $2.25 $3.00 $3.00 $3.00 
The dividend po1i~y of Shell Oil Company has been 
quite conservative over the years and has been a little over 
50% of earnings. During tae war ye~rs, the dividend as a 
percentage of earnings was extremely high but as the war 
ended and income became greater and expansion progressed, the 
dividend as a_ percentage of earnings began to diminish. With 
the retained earnings, the company was able to f'aeili tate 
part of' its expansion program although they had to borrow a n 
addit-ional $125 million. If an Exeess Profits Tax was in 
effect during this period, the borrowed amount would have 
been much greater 
Sehedul.e of Profits and Taxes ~ $100 .2!_ Sales 
(source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Prof' its $5.16 15.'78 $5.12 $5.01 .5.75 $5.05 
Taxes 1.49 3.33 7.26 7.82 7.80 .83 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Prof'its $7.42 $9.53 $13.41 $9.36 $9.90 
Taxes 2.10 3.06 4.90 3.15 5.24 
The taxes during the war caused the profits in 
1942, 1943, and 1944 to be lower than the expense per $100 
of' sales. In 1950 the Exee s s Prof'i t s Tax amounted to better 
than 51.5 cents of' the sties figure. This seems minute but 
I would like to stress again that the Excess Profits Tax was 
only in ef'f'eet from .ruly to December and therefore if you 
would calculate the expense on a per annum basis, the tax · 
would amount to over $1.23 or a little over 19~ of the tax 
expense. 
Schedule of' Net Plant and Equipment (in millions) 
(Source is Moodyt s Investors Service) -
1940 
$227.7 
1941 
$228.9-
1942 1943 1944 1945 
$199.5 $222.5 $213.4 $175.2 
(Schedule continued on next page) 
'18. 
1946 
$191.9 
1947 
$276.5 
1948 
$333.9 
1949 
$343.7 
1950 
$343.3 
The net property assets or Shell Oil Company have 
not increased to any great extent since 1940. But in 1945 
they were about fifty million dollars less than 1940; so 
fran 1945 to 1950, the increase bas been nearly doubled. 
This is substantial for during the war the heavy EXCess 
Frofits Tax caused a depletion in reserves tor future ex-
pansion and after the war, Shell Oil Company had to go out 
into the market in order to obtain funds for its expansion 
program. In l§J50, althoU:gh the Property account increased 
by about $50 million, the depreciation taken on all properties 
more than offset this increase and as a result showed a net 
property decrease between 1949 and 1950. 
1940 
$85 
1946 
$.124 
Schedule . or Funded Debt (in millions) 
{Source iS:Moodyts Investors Service) 
1941. 1942 ~9.43 1944 
$10;8 $104 $94 $84 
1947 1948 1949 1950 
$122 $121 $120 #117 
1945 
$81 
The funded debt of Shell Oil Company is rather high 
although in 1950, the cash and marketable securities of $136 
million were more than enough to cover them if forced to 
liquidate. The bonds are 2 1/2 debentures, authorized $125 
million, dated April 1• 1946 and maturing April 1, 1971. 
The securities are callable and a Sinking Fund Provision is 
provided calling for $l,ooo.ooo deposited each year from 
1947 - 1955 and $5 1000,000 from 1.956 - 1.970. The sinking 
fund cannot be reduced below $50,000 on each August 15th. 
The bonds were issued and carry the name of the Shell Union 
Oil Corporation. 
Schedule .2! Fixed. Charges Earned After Taxes and De pre cia tion 
(Source is Moodiy' s Investors Service} 
1940 1941 1.942 1943 1.944 1945 
7.5 6.7 6.3 5.3 ll.2: 1.1.7 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
12.6. 1.9.9 36.5 26.0 31..1 
'rhe fixed char·ges earning ratio has grea tl.y in-
creased since 1940 even though in 1940 the funded debt was 
only $85 million and today it is over $11.7 million. As 
was previously mentioned, there is sufficient cash and 
marketable securities to cover the funded debt at December 
3.1, 1950. During the war, the Excess Profits Tax was the 
reason for the low rate and if the debt ha dntt decreased in 
1950, the ratio of fixed charges earned would have declined 
slightly over 1949 for an Excess Profits Tax has a great 
effect on the rates. 
The capitalization of Shell Oil Company is re-
presented by about 22 1/2% in funded debt and 77 1/2% in 
c·omm.on stock and surplus to day. DUring the war era when 
Excess Profits Tax was in effect, the funded debt represented 
on the average about 30% and Common stock about 70% even 
so. 
though the: debt was substantia,lly smsl.ler tban today . 
An Excess Profits Tax w.ill effect Shell Oil Com-
pany for now, they will not · be able to expand with such ease 
for the Excess Profits Tax will remove those extra profits 
that make expansion less cost~y. With an Excess Profits Tax 
liability of $5.6 million this year and on a complete cal-
endar basis, $11.2 million, the tax next year should be much 
greater for increased sales over 1950 are expected. With-
ou t doubt, Shell Oil Company has not reached the peak of 
development and the climb from now on wi ll be much more dif-
ficult. 
'f'o partially substantiate my claims, tb.e sales 
far Shell Oil Company were 61% greater f or the first quar-
te r of 1951 over 1950 while the net income increased only 
5%. This was caused by the sba rp increase in taxes with 
an Excess Profits Tax for three months operation of $6.6 
million. 
81. 
sa. 
3. Standard Oil Company of ~ Jersey 
The Standard Oil Company was incorporated in New 
Jersey on August 5, 1882 by the trustees of the Standard Oil 
Trust to acquire from tbe trustees in exchange for stock the 
property of the Standard Oil Company (Ohio). In March, 1892 
the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey obtained from the 
trustees of the Stand ard Oil Trust for exchange of their stock, 
other stock and property which was held by the Trust. In May 
of ~911, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a de-
cision of the lower cou.rts whlch held that the company was a 
combination in violation of the Sherman .Anti-Trust r.aw.s and 
ordered a dissolution in 33 companies on a pro rata basis to 
Standard Oil Company's Stockholders. In 1927, i~ became ex-
clusive~y a holding company by organizing the Standard 
Shipping Company which acquired all its marine department 
and vessels and the Esso Standard Oil company which acquired 
all its manufacturing and marketing plants and equipment. The 
company bas been building its holdings by buying ard selling 
subsidiaries and today is consider·ed the largest holding com-
pany in the oil industry. 
The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey's subsidiaries 
are engaged in the acquisition, exp~oration,. and exploitation 
of oil an.d gas lands; in buying and selling crude oil; in 
transporting oil by pipe line, in refining crude oil, in 
transporting refined products by pipe line, boat, and auto-
mobile; in marketing petroleum products at wholesale and 
retail; also in buying, selling, transporting and distributing 
o:f natural gas; res.earch and the development of patents and 
obtaining patent rights; the production of chemicals which 
are a by-product of the indus try. The Standard Oil Company 
of New .Jersey, Conoolidated, is perhaps the most complete 
unit in the :l.ndustry today. The oompa ny has about 38 af-
t'iliates which are spread thrrugb.out the world. 
Schedule of Cash and Marketable Securities (in millions) 
{source-is Moody's Investors S.ervice} 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Cash $189 $163 $131.8 $1.74.6 $165 $182 
Mk. Sec. 98.9 170 122.2 a5 .• o 383 432.9 
Total $287.9 $333 $254.0, $389.5 $"5"m $614.9 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Cash $l-73 $192, $193 $202 $224 
·Mk. Sec. 358 273 222 351 578 
Total $531 $455 $4l5 $553 $~ 
The · cash po·sit ion of Standard Oil Company ot. New 
.rersey m s about tripled si nee 1940. During the war, when a 
large Excess Profits Tax was paid, the cash position remained 
in good stead. In 1950, When taxes almost doubled the 1949 
t'igure, the cash was increased some $250 million. Although 
an Excess P.rofits Tax will play a part in the cash position 
of standard Oil Company of New .rersey, the company shall be 
in a better financial. position than others in the industry. 
1940 
5.04 
1946 ' 
3.60 
Sahedule of . Working Oa~ital Ratios 
{Source is Moody's fnves ors Service) 
1941 
3.70 
194.7 
2.68 
1948 
2.26 
1943 
3.14 
1949 
3.12 
1944 
3.11 
1950 
3.12 
1945 
3.95 
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
is. quite strong. The position becomes even better when we 
realize that the current assets are represented by about 45% 
in cash. The company at this time is able to redeem all its 
current 1iabili ties and still have a cash balance 'Which can-
not be claimed by every company in the industry. Now that 
an Excess Profits Tax is in effect, the ratio rna y suffe r 
slightly depending upon the position the management takes in 
future financing. 
Schedule of Operating Incoroo (in billions) 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1940 
$ .821 
1946 
$1.522 
1941 
$.978 
1947 
$2.354 
1942 
$1.039 
1948 
$3.30 
1943 
$1.302 
1949 
$2.89 
1944 
$1.538 
1950 
$3.134 
1945 
$1.518 
The operating income of Standard Oil Company of 
New ;rersey, Consolidated, bas increased almost four times 
since 1940. The war caused a sharp rise in sales; and after 
84. 
too war with new devices being employed to improve conditioo.s, 
the sales increased tremendously. The increased usage of 
c.ars, diesel engines, airplanes and the like, along with a 
growing demand for oil in the homes, caused the industry to 
expand and this expansion would have been extremely costly 
under an Excess Profits· Tax. Now that an Excess Profits Tax 
is in effect again, the future of the oil industry and stan-
dard Oil Company of New Jersey, in particular, may be placed 
in je o.rardy. 
1940 
$123 
194.6 
$177 
Schedule of Net Inccm..e (in. millions) 
(Sou.rce is Moody's Investors SerVice) 
1941 
$140 
~947 
$268 
1942 
$83 
1948 
$365 
1943 
$123 
1949 
$268 
1944 
$.155 
1950 
$408 
1945 
$154 
The net incolll9 of Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey, consolidated, has been quite consistant wi th the 
increase in sales for income has grown about four· times. 
During the war, with the large taxes and especially the 
Excess Profits Tax, tble net income of the company was kep t 
to a minimum. Now tJilat a new Excess Profits Tax has been 
employed by the United States Government, the income will 
not increase as readily as sales for the taxes will more 
than remo~e the excess. 
Schedule of All Income Taxes (in millions) 
(Source-rs~ody's Investors-servic e} 
1940 
$34.6 
1946 
$73 
1941 
$60.5 
1947 
$135 
1942 
$50.0 
1948 
.$20·3 
1943 
$93.0 
1949 
$11.5 
1944 
$114.8 
19.50 
$207 
1945 
$59 
85. 
The taxes of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 
Consolidated, bave increased alm.ost six ti.roos since 1940. 
The taxes in 1951 shall be substantially hi@l.er than in 
1950 because the full effect of the new tax program was not 
included in 1950 for the taxes were increased as of JUly 1, 
1950. 
Schedule. of Excess l?rof'its Taxes (in millions) 
(source is Moodyt s Investors Service) 
1940 
' $3.9 
1950 
24.4 
1941 
$.51 
1942 
$3.5 
1943 
$25. 
1944 
$49. 
1945 
$4. 
The Excess Profits Tax for 1950 is just an es-
tima·te made, for the exact figures cannot be obtained at 
this time. The tax in 1950 is almost as high as that which 
was paid during the war even though the tax was more severe. 
The full tax burden will be felt next year though when the 
Excess Profits Tax rate of 30% is used. This tax is indeed 
quite substantial and when the full effeet is known, it will 
prove quite detrimental. 
Schedule: ~ EarninJs Per Share of c.ommon Stock 
(Source is Mo yt'S"Investorsservice) 
1940 
$4.54 
1946 
$6.50 
1941 
$5.15 
1947 
$9.83 
1942 
$3.06 
1948 
$12.44 
1943 
$4.45 
1949 
$8•91 
1944 
$5.69 
1950 
#13.48 
1945 
$5.64 
8&. 
The earnings per share have been quite impressive 
and have shown great prospects of' increasing. But, with the 
new Excess Profits Tax. the increases in earnings will be 
nil for tbe purpose of the tax is to remove as m.ueh as pos-
sible those increased earnings. Even though the management · 
through tneir skills have increased their earnings ithout 
increase in price or sales, those added profits will be ab-
sorbed by the Excess Profits Tax. 
Schedule .2f. Income and Taxes ~ !100 of Sales 
(Source is Moody's Investors ervice) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Income $15 .as $14.37 $8.02 $.9.31 $9.48 $9.53 
Taxes 4.21 6.19 4.81 7.14 7.00 4.26 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Income $10.95 $11.41 $11.08 $9.30 $13.05 
T·axes 4.50 5.73 6.15 3.97 6.62· 
The percentage of profits to $100 of sales have 
increased substantially over 1949. But, the increase in 
taxes is much grea ter than the gain in income. Since the 
Excess Profits Tax will be increased next year, the tax will 
be even greater next year and tbe percentage will increas.e 
while the percentage of' profits will decrease next year. 
1940 
$1.05 
1946 
$1.27 
Schedule of ~Property (in billions) 
(Source is Moody's Investors Service) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
$1.04 $1.10 $1.09 $1.10 
1947 
$1.52 
1948 
$1.85 
1949 
$2.08 
1950 
$2.12 
1945 
$1.13 
87. 
~he net property of Standard Oil C·Omp!lny of New 
J"ersey has increased about twice. This is considerable 
since the increase was $1.07 bil~ion. ~e expansion was 
accomplished in a great part through the reinvesting of 
earnings. Now that a.n Excess Profits T'ax is in effect, the 
ability of tbe eom];eny to expand through reinvested earnings 
will be limited for now, Excess Profits Tax will take a great 
deal of those extra dollars wb:ich were used in the past for 
expansion purposes. 
1940 
$187 
1946 
$198 
Schedule of Funded Debt (in millions) 
(Sour-ce isMoodyts iiiVe'stors Service) 
1941 
$194.5 
1947 
t213 
1942 
$248 
1948 
$225 
1943 
$232 
1949 
$475 
1944 
$214 
1950 
$441 
1945 
$203 
Tbe funded debt of the eo·mpany has in.creased ov er 
the years but the increase was used for expansion purposes. 
The debt consists in P9. rt of loans, notes, and bonds of the 
ptrent and mbsidiary companies. 
1940 
14.13 
1946 
26.52 
Schedule of Fixed Charges Earned 
(Scarce Is Moody's Investors Service) 
1941 
16.26 
1947 
40.68 
1942 
8.15 
1948 
57.71 
1943 
15.15 
1949 
28.26 
1944 
18.73 
1950 
30.42 
1945 
23.00 
It seems. rela t.ively certain that the funded debt 
charges are secure but with the Excess Profits Tax the fixed 
88. 
charge times earnings will decrease. The fine pictu.re 
shown will undoubtedl.y be darkened by the new Excess Profits 
Tax. 
Now, let us consider the statements and financial 
conditions of the Parent Company• the Standard Oil Company 
of New- eTersey. 
S.chedule of Earnings Per Share of Common Stock 
(source is Moody"s Investorsservicel 
1940 
$2.90 
19-46 
$3.83 
1941 
$3.11 
194'1 
$4.71 
1942 
$3.26 
1948 
$5.31 
1943 
$2.25 
1949 
$5.69 
1944 
$3.08 
1950 
$7.23 
1945 
:J3.44 
The earnings or Standard Oil Company of New erersey 
have increased considerably sinee 1940, and about 70~ of 
earnings were distributed to its stockholders. 
Schedule of Dividends Paid Per Share of Common Sto~ 
(Souree is Moody's Investors Service} 
1940 
$1.75 
1946 
$3.0-8 
1941 
$2.50 
1947 
$4.00 
1942 
$2.00 
1948 
$2.00 
1943 
$2.00 
1949 
$4.00 
1944 
$2.50 
1950 
$5.00, 
1945 
$2.50 
89. 
In 1943, a stock dividend of 1 share of consolidated 
Natural Gas Company was declared for each 10. shares of Stan-
dard Oil Company of New Jersey held. In 1946, The Portland 
Pipe Line company mde a disbursement equal to eigtl.t c-ents 
per share to standard Oil comp3.ny (New .Jersey) stockholders. 
In ~948 and 1949, stock di videiXls were also. paid by the 
parent company to its stockholders. Now tbat an Excess 
Profits Tax is in effect, the dividends will probably de-
crease because the dividends received by the parent company 
will be decreased for the subsidiaries will have the Excess 
Profits Tax to contend with. 
If we consider the amount of dividends distributed 
to the stockholders in relation to the amount of earnings of 
the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Conso~idated, t he 
amount was equivalent to about 39.3% since .1940. This is a 
most important consideration because the parent company is a 
holding company and all its income is derived from interest 
and dividends paid by the subsidiaries. 
90. 
It is quite true to say that the Excess Profits Tax 
will not affect the parent company too greatly but it would 
be a more exact statement to say that the consolidated com-
pany and in turn the parent c~pany will be greatly affe~ted 
by Excess Profits Tax. Since the c~pany ha·s followed the 
. princip~e of expansion through reinvested earnings, this 
growth will be less prominent now for an Excess Profits Tax 
will remove a substantial part of those extra dollars which 
could have been used for expan~ion. 
The dividends and income of the parent company will 
no doubt suffer slightly for the subsidiaries, in order to 
maintain their excellent financial situation, will be forced 
to retain a greater portion or· their earnings in orde r to 
offset the effects of the Excess Profits Tax. 
Since the unit which is controlled by Standard Oil 
Company of New J""ersey is in such a strong and well-balanced 
financial situation, the Excess Profits Tax will play an 
important part although the company will be in a better 
position than others in the industry. 
91. 
Chapter V 
Public Utilities 
1. Illinois Pow.er Company 
The company was originally incorporated as the 
Illinois Power arrd Light Corporation in Illinois on May 25, 
1923 by a consolidation of a number of public utility com-
panies which were operating in the state of Illinois. The 
name was changed to the Illinois Iowa Pow·er Company on May 1, 
1937 with the present title being adopted on November 1, 
1943. 
Illinois Power CODl:J;any is principally engaged in 
the purchase and sale of electricity and gas. Also, heating 
and water service is carried on by the company in a lim.i ted 
manner. The comps:ny is an operating company but does one 
active, 100% owned, subsidiary and six inactive. 
Schedul.e of Cash and Marketable Securities 
{Source-rs Annual Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943. 1944 1945. 
Cash $5.5 $5;.3 $5.9 $10.3 $7.4 $10.7 
Mk. Sec. .s .6 .5 .4 
Total $5.5 $5.'3 $6:'1 $16.9 $8.0 $11.1 
1946· 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Cash $5.7 $1.0 $1.5 $2.4 $4.4 
Mk. Sec. .4 
Total $"'l.T $I:'O $176 $2.4 $4.4 
The cash position of Illinois Power Com.pany today 
is much better than it had been only a few years before. 
During the war, the expansion of the company was limited due 
to high cost and shortages of materials so that the amount 
of cash was high. From. 1947 on, the com..pany began to spend 
fo r improvements and expansion so that the amount of cash 
per books began to decline. With the new tax program coming 
to the fore, the com..pany again will probably relax some of 
i t s expansion plans for as time progresses, the cost for 
expansion is becoming ever more greater. 
Schedule of Net Current Assets (in millions) 
TSoU.ree is A.nnua.l Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1.944 1945 
$5.7 $&.5 $&.9 $7.2 $8.9 $12.6 
194{> 1947 1948 1949 1950 
$5.3 $d3.2 $d6.9 $d9.7 $d.6· 
The net current asset picture of Illinois power 
bas definit~ly improved and now that the expansion program 
that was commenced in late 1945 is about completed, the net 
current asset position will improve considerably. But, if 
the income of the company exceed 10% of the 1.950 income per 
share of common, an Excess Profits Tax will be paid and 
since the normal and sur taxes have increased also, this 
factor will p].ay an important part in their future cash and 
net current assets position of the company. 
Schedule of Gross Operating Revenue (in millions) 
- (Source is Annual Reports} 
1940 
$21.4 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$23.0 $24.7 $26.7 $28.3 $29.8 (Schedule is continued on next page) 
93. 
1946 
$30.2 
1947 
$32.6 
1948 
$37.3 
1949 
$40.3 
1950 
$45.3 
The increase in operating facilities has shown 
a marked increase in operating revenue in the last few 
years. Since the Expansion program of Illinois power Com-
. pany has not as yet been completed, the full effect will 
not be shown until 1952 or late 1951. It is at this time 
that the new tax program will without doubt come into the 
picture and especially the Excess Profits Tax. A great part 
of the expansion program, as carried out by Illinois Power 
Company, was with reinvested earnings and such expansion is 
hurt most by an Excess Profits Tax. 
Schedule of Income and Excess Profits Tax (in millions) 
- (source is Annual Report'ST - · 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Ino:ome $ .5 $ .a $ .6 $ .4 $ .1 
E.P.T. .9 1.5 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Income $2.0 $2.8 $3.4 . $4.0 $5.0 
E.P.T. 
The income taxes of Illinois Power Company has 
increased 10 times since 1950 and the increase will be even 
greater next year when the full effect of the new tax pro-
gram is applied. The two years that an Excess Profits Tax 
was paid by Illinois p·ower Company exceeded the regula r in-
come tax but because of the poor year that followed, an 
Excess Profits Tax was not paid and in 1945, there was no 
94. 
ine:ome tax expense. With the new rates, and when the 
f'ruits of' expansion are received, the tax expense of 
Illinois Power Company will be substantially increased. 
1940 
$2 .0 
1946 
$5.0 
Schedule of Net Income (in millions} 
(source-r5 Annual Reports) 
1941 
$2.8 
1947 
$5.3 
1942 
$2.9 
1948 
$6.0 
1943 1944. 
$3.2 $2.6 
1949 1950 
$5.9 $7 .5· 
1945 
$2.8 
The net income of the company has shown great 
prospects and it will probably continue to be so. With all 
conditions remaining e~ual, an Excess Profits Tax will have 
to be paid when Income is about $8.5 million, according to 
the present tax structure. This may prove detrimental to 
as progressive a company as Illinois Power Company for they 
have increased their income by and through reinvested 
earnings. With a ceiling placed on their earnings now, the 
f uture expansion policy of the company will be changed. 
1940 
$95 
1.946 
$105 
Schedule of Gross Prope.rtl (in millions) (Source i s.Annual Reports -
1941 
$97 
1947 
$ll8 
1942 
$99 
1948 
$139 
1943 
$99 
1949 
$179 
1944 
$1.00 
195.0. 
$201 
1945 
$102 
The gross property of Illinois Power Compa.ny has 
increased twice since the early forties. The greatest 
96. 
expansion was after the Excess Profits Tax had been repea~ed. 
Now that a new Excess Profits Tax is in effect, it could 
prove a dangerous weapon in the future. s it looks today , 
Ill inois should be able to increase its earnings about 10% 
before an Excess Profits Tax i s paid but because of the ex-
pansion this increa se should not be too difficult to obtain . 
1940 
97.7 
1946 
$55.2 
Schedule of Long-term. Debt (in millions) ( soo . rce is Annual Re port"S} -
1941 1942 1943 ~944. 1945 
$96.5 $94.9 $77.4 74.8 54 .. 2 
1947 1.948 1949 1950 
$55 .2 $70.2 $85.2 $94 .. 8 
The l.ong term debt of Illinois Power Company has 
been quite conservativ e and in most years has borro.ed under 
the 50% of Capita lization ].II.ark. Today, it stands at about 
52% at all invested capital. Even though the Funded Debt has 
increased, a great portion of the expansion carried on by 
Illinois Power Company has been out of reinvested ea r nings. 
Schedule of Times Charges Earned After 
TSource is .Annual Reports) 
Taxes 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
1.37 1.50 1.54 1.62 1.80 1.91 
~946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
3.90 4.89 4.36 5.10 3.81 
The earnings times fixed charge record of Illinois 
Power since the war is an impressive one. The high taxes 
paid by the Oom.pan.y, especially the Excess Profits Tax , 
kept the ability of the canpany from showing a good record. 
No that taxes have been increased and an Excess Profit s 
Tax is in effect, we can look for a poorer picture her e. 
1940 
$1.10 
1946 
. $4.83 
Schedule of Earnings Per Share of Common 
(Source is Annual Report Sf 
1941 
t2 . 03 
1947 
$3.67 
1942 
$2 . 25 
1948 
$2 . 93 
1943 
$2.64 
1949 
$3.04 
1944 
$1.89 
1950 
$2.82 
1945 
2.05· 
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The earnings per share of common stock of Illinois 
Power Company have increased substantially since 1940. But , 
since 1946, the income has f a ltered because of the expansion 
program which bas caused the fUnded debt to increase a nd 
therefore a sizable increase in charges. Also, the expenses 
of the comp3.ny have been on the upg~ade but these things 
should le vel. off shortly. 
1940 
1946 
Schedule of Dividends :Per Common Stack 
(Source is Annua~eports) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 
1947 1948 1949 1 950 
1.00 $2.00 $ 2.05 $2.20 
1945 
The Illinois F'ow er C.ompany has distri ruted about 
24. 7% of its earnings to its common stockholders since 1940 
and about 58.1% since 1947. It was in 1947 that the old 
common stock was revamped and exchanged far new common. 
The policy of the company has been to reinvest earnings in 
order to exJSnd and meet all new necessary improveln9nts with 
reta ined earnings. This is indeed an excellent policy bu t 
with the new Excess Profits Tax, this i dea may be altered 
for a reduction can be elaine d for all new capital borrowed. 
The Illinois Power Company. should do quite well 
uni.er the neVJ tax program for an Excess Profits Tax ill not 
have to be met until the income has increased about 10% per 
share of common stock. Atter this point is reached, t h e 
Excess P rofi t s Tax will drop quite heavily into the future 
earnings of Illinois PO't'V er c.cmpany. 
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2. .American Gas and Electric Company 
The American Gas and Electric was incorporated in 
New York on December 20, 1906 and reincorporated February 
18, 1925 as a . consolidation of American Gas and Electric 
Company and Appalachian Securities Corpor~tion. In January 
1907, the company took over all property and assets of Elec-
tric Company of .America and subsequently acquired through 
cash, merger or consolidation a number of subsidiary caa-
panies. As of December 31, 1950, the subsidiaries of the 
central system of American Gas and Electric Company, which 
are 100% owned, are the Appalachian Electric Power Company, 
Indiana and Michigan Electric Company, Incorporated, Kentucky 
and West Virginia Power Canpany, Incorporated, Kingsport 
Utilities, Incorpora tea, and The Ohio Power Company • 
.American Gas and Electric is a holding compa ny and 
according to a ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the central system of the comrany is a complete in-
tegrated unit, retainable under the Public Utilities Holding 
comp3.ny Act. Under the pronruncement on December 26, 1945, 
the comp3.ny bad to sever relations with.: Atlantic City 
Electric Company, The Scranton Electric Company, est Pilts-
ton-Exeter Railroe. d Company, Deepwater Operating Company, 
and South Pennsgrove Realty C.ompany. The liquidation of 
these assets was accomplished partly by direct sale and 
partly by giving to the company stockholders, a s dividends, 
100. 
the stock o~ these subsidiaries. The Americ~ Gas and 
Electric Service Corporation was approved as an organization 
serving the system. It was organized to operate as a non-
profit company to aid and of:fer the wbsidiaries of the system 
assistance in administration, financing, accounting, legal, 
statistical and otmr general. services. 
Schedule of Cash and Marketable Securities (~millio-ns l 
- ---rsouree is .Annual Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
cash 41.2' $30.35 $30.5 $34.6 $31.2 $25.1 
Mk. Sec. .9 .05 2.0 2.5 13.9 11.6 
Tot.al $42.1 $30.41 $32 .• 5 $37.2 $457! $35.7 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Cash $26.7 $35.1 $21.5 $24,6 $29.4 
Mk. Sec. 6.1 13.4 17.3 14.1" 13 .• 2 
Total $32.8 $48.5 $38.8 $38.7 $42.6 
The cash position of American Gas and Electric 
CODLpany and Subsidiaries is an impressive one for a Pttblic 
Utility Company for about 50~ of current assets is represented 
by cash. During the war, due to the large Excess Prof! t s Tax 
paid by the company, the cash was depleted sligatly aLthough 
the management tried to maintain a strong financial position. 
Schedule of Net current Assets (in millions) 
TSoii'rce is An.nua,i Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$38.6 $26.5 #10.8 $13.0 $20.6 $29.8 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
$18.3 $33.6 $23.5 $38.6 $39.3 
The net current assets bas been gaining steadily 
and now is slightly above "the pre-watr figure. The heavy 
taxes paid by the system aeconnted for a great part of the 
decline. Also, following the war, the expansion program 
caused a slight decline. 
Schedule .Qf_ Gross Operating Revenues (~millions) 
- (Source is .Annual Reports) 
1940 
$71.8 
1945 
$103.9 
1941 
$82.1 
1947 
$124.4 
1942 
$89.1 
1948 
$145.0 
1943 
$95.8 
1949 
$149·.5 
1944 
$102.2 
1950 
$167.7 
1945 
$103.3 
~e operating revenue has increased substantially 
for the unit over the period of years. Due to the new tax 
program however,. a great climb in revenue will not be 
equally significant in income for Excess Profits T·ax will 
assume tm greatest. part. 
Schedule of Income and Excess Profits Taxes (in millions) 
(source is .Annmi Reports) -
1940 1941 1942 1943· 1944 1945 
Income $5.3 $7.0 $7.7 $7.7 $8.0 $7.9 
E.P.T. 2.5 9.5 11..8 12.2 2 .4 
19:45 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Income $11.4 $12.3 $13.0 $13.8 $17.2 
E.P.T. ..._ 
The consolidated system of American Gas and 
Electric company paid a high Excess Profits Tax during the 
war and this had a damaging effect for they were forced to 
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borrow more at the end of the war f'or expansion than would 
have resu~.ted if the Excess Profits Tax had been lower. 
102. · 
Since t:te profits of a Public Utility Company are controlled 
by state commissions, an .Excess Profits Tax which does not 
allow for relief is harmful because of the large funded debt 
of too system. Under the new Excess Profits Tax law, some 
relief is granted and the companies are granted a credit of 
5% of invested capital. This seems ~ite fair considering 
tm t all companies do not make the credit. exemption and yet 
in certain instances, it seems unreasonable. 
During the w.ar, the pa·rent company, .A.merioa:n Gas 
and Electric company, ma.de no provisions far Excess profits 
Tax and in 1950 no provision was made. It is estimated that 
the income can increase about 5% before an EXcess Profits 
Tax will .mve to be paid. 
1940 
$18.6 
1946 
$19.6 
Schedule of Net Income (in millions) 
(Source 1S Annual Reports) 
1941 
$18.4 
194'7 
$22.3 
1942 
$15.0 
1948 
$23.9, 
1943 
$15.0 
1949 
$25.8 
1944 
$15.5 
1950 
$29.7 
1945 
$15.5 
..&l.thougb. the gross revenue of the system has in-
creased substantially, the income bas not shown a net 
effect. The high taxes during the war caused a low income 
figure in comparison to the gross revenue and after the war, 
the expenses increased while the rates were held down 
therefore the poor showing o:r net income. With the ili-
oreased taxes today, the unit will be affected more than 
other companies becau se in the good years after the war, 
their profits were not in unison with other companies in 
the industry. However, the American Gas and Electric com-
pany System ma:y benefit if no expansion is desired. 
Schedul.e .2f.. Net Prolerty Additi.ons (in mil.lions) 
(Source s .AnnuaT Rep.orts.} 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$11.9 $19.3 #22 .• 8 $16.2 $14.1 $19.5 
1945 1947 1948 19'49 1950 
$22.9 $50.5 $5·8.4 $74.0 $68.7 
The .American Gas and Electric System bas grown 
tremendously since the end of the war. The addition to 
plant and equipment has been quite sizable and this was 
bought through the reinvesting or earnings and the in-
ereasing of funded debt. Now tmt. the Excess Pro:f'i ts Tax 
is in effect again, t h e growth shall without doubt be our-
tailed for the earnings shall not be increased too greatly 
and the cost of borrowing is constantly going up. 
SchedUle of Long-term Debt (in millions) 
(Source is Annual Reports) 
194.0 
$202.9 
1946 
:1)210 .9 
1941 
$213.7 
19:47 
$238.5 
1942 
$234.4 
1948 
$284.7 
1943 
$232.3 
1949 
$286.2 
1944 
$231.8 
1950 
$349.5 
1945 
$220.5 
1.03. 
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The funded debt of the system has. inc·reased substan-
tially since 1940. In order to meet the greater demands of 
industry and also civilian c.onsumption, the company's expan-
sion in 1950 was sizable and was financed mostly through 
funded debt. Further expansion will prove even more costly 
now tb.a t taxes have been increased and if profits are gained 
above the o% credit, an Exc·ess Profits Tax will be paid. 
This tax in the case of the American Gas and Electric syste~ 
is quite dangerous far the eo~pany needs all its extra 
earnings in order to reduce its funded debt and in turn 
better its financial position. 
It is true to s 'ay the .American Gas and Electric is 
in a good financial situation according to the structure of 
the public utilities industry but it could be better and with 
the Excess Profits Tax, the improvement at this time does not 
see~ to hopeful. 
Schedule of Over-all Charges Earned .A:tter 
-(Source Is Annua-l Reports} 
Taxes 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944. 1945 
1.96 2.07 1.91. 1.90 2.10 3.02 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
2.70 2.75 2.80 2.85 2.91. 
The. over-al~ charges earned after taxes for the 
system bas been improving even though the debt has been in-
creased. NOW that an Excess Profits Tax is in effect, and 
the income is increased due to expansion, it will not be 
long before Excess Profits Taxes are paid and the charges 
earned figure will remain relatively stable. 
System 
Parent 
System 
Parent 
Schedule of Earnings per Share of Common 
tsoorce is Annua.l ReportST 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944. 
$2.99 $2 .72 $2.21 $2.23 $2.32 
2.09 2.27 1.65 1.68 1.81 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
$3.80. $4.18 $4.32 $4.31 $4.86 
2.76 3.0.~ 2.89 3.09 4.01 
The earnings of American Gas and Electric 
1945 
2.32 
1.94 
Company 
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per share of comm..on and per the system have increased substan-
tially over the period. The amount of earnings reinvested 
have been 42.5% per system and 23.35% per parent. 
Sehedule of Dividends ~ Share o:r Common stock 
-(soo.rce is .A.Imual Reports) 
1.940 1941 1942 1.943 1944 1945 
$2.00 $2.00 $1.70 $1.80 $1 .80 $1.90 
1946. 194'1 1948 1949 1950 
$2.15 $1 .25 $1.00 $2e.25 $3.00 
( 1) (2) ($) ' . -
(1) Also paid three dividends of 2/100 of a share of 
Atlantic City Electric Com.,Iany common (total computed cash 
value of $1.11). 
(2) Also paid three dividends of 3/100 of a · share of 
Atlantic Oi~y Electric company common (total computed cash 
value of $.1. 52) • 
(3). Also paid one dividend of 3/100 of a share of 
Atlantic City Electric Company common (total computed cash 
value ot $.48}. 
lOth 
T'he dividend p·olicy of tbe company has been to 
reinvest a large part of its earnings. The amount of re-
invested earnings of the system in relation to the dividends 
paid by the parent is 57.5% and the amount of dividends to 
parents earnings is 76.65%. With an Excess Profits Tax and 
increased ta:x: rate t the amount of dividends may falter 
slightly and if they don't, the company will not be able to 
reinvest as great a percent of earnings. 
The capitalization of American Gas and Electric 
system is represented by about 50% in Funded Debt, 1.7% in 
Preferred Stock and 33% in Common Stock equity. .Although 
this is a typical policy for the public utilities industry, 
·the funded debt could be reduced if Excess Profits Tax had 
not been so damaging in the war years. 
Now the American Gas and Electric is faced with 
a new problem of Excess :Profits Ta:x:, it is not too great 
for they shall be able to increase their earnings about 
5% before an Excess Profits Tax. If the expected increase 
in income is received because o:f the expansion program, the 
tax could prove quite detrimental. 
3. Central And South West c.orporation 
The Central and South West Corporation was in-
corporated in Delaware on July 31, 1925 as Centra l and 
South West Utilities Company with the present name being 
adopted on February 3, 1947. The company is a: registered 
holding compa ny and ~as organized to acquire the stock of 
American Public Service Company, Public Service Company of 
O~lahoma, Central Power and Light Comps ny, Southwestern 
Securities Company and Chickasha Gas and Electric Company . 
On Febrm ry 3, 1947, Centra 1 and so.uth ~1est corporation 
mer ged its subsidiary American Public Service Company. 
The subsidiaries of Central and South est Cor-
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poration are located in the southwestern part of the United 
States. Today, the principle companies owned by Central 
and south West Corporation are West Texas Utility Company , 
Public Service COm:f8ny of Okla hon:e:, Central Power and Light 
com_pany and southwestern Gas and Electric Company. The 
companies are engaged in the manufacturing, transportL~g 
and sell~g of electric power, water power and ice. 
Schedule of Cash and 11'arketable Securities {in millions) 
,.- ---rsoo.rce is Annual. Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944. 1945 
cash $ 4.5 $ 5.7 $ 4.9 $ 5.5 $ 7.5 6.69 
:Mk . Sec. 2.4 1.9 2.4 5.7 8.1 4.0 
Total. $ 6.9 • 7~6 $ 7.3 $11.2 tm.:-6 16 .. 69 
Hl46 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Cash $ 5.2 $ 5,3 $11.7 $14.i $ 9.0 
Mk. Sec. 6.1 . .4 . .4 . 9.5 .15.0 
Total $!2.3 $5.7 $-rn:T $~ $24.0 
The cash position of Central and South .est 
Corporation bas increased almost four times since 1940. 
The drastic decline in the balance of cash and marketable 
securities in 1947, can be attributed to the fact that 
during the year the company and its subsidiaries paid bank 
loans of over $5 million and expenses of over $21 million 
for additions and repla cermn ts to utility propert.y. The 
cash and marketable securities as of late has represented 
aboUt 2/3 of current assets and more than covered current 
liabilities. The cash position of the company is certainly 
an excellent one. 
Schedule of Net Current Assets (in millions) 
~ource 1 s An.nuai Reporl'S) . . 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$5.0 $4.0 $1.4 $4.5 $3.9 3.0 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
'3.3 (d5.3] $5.4 $13.2 $13.4 
The net current assets of the unit is not too 
impressive but in the la.st two years it bas improved con-
siderably. Now that the taxes ba ve increased and an Excess 
Profits Tax is in effect, we can look for a decline here. 
Schedule of Operating Revenues {.!..£ millions) 
T§ou.rce is .Annual Reports) 
Electric 
Other 
Tota.l 
1940 
$28.5 
4.5 
$33.0 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$30.9 $32.8 $36.9 $40.2 $41.9 
4.4 . 5.1 . 5.4 7.1 7.5 
$35.3 $37.9 $43.3 $'4'7':"3" 49.4 
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(Schedule continued on following page) 
Electric 
Other 
Total 
1946 
$43.5 
6.3 $49.8 
1947 
$48.7 · 
5.8 $54.5 
1948 
$57.3 
4.5 
$~ 
1949 
62.5 
3.9 
$66.5' 
1950 
$69.4 
3.2 $72.6 
The operating income of the consolidated company 
have more than doubled over the period studied. Since the 
company bas expanded due to the demands of the consumers, 
new financing was needed in order to accomplish this end 
for taxes during the war delt a deadly blow to Public 
Utilities which in turn left little from earnings to re-
invest. 
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Schedule of Incan.e Taxes and Excess Profits ~ (in millions) 
(SOQrce is Annual Reports} 
1940 1941 1.942 1943 1944 1945 
Income $1.0 $2.5 $3.0 $2.5 $8.0 2.6 
E.P.T. 1.2 2.7 4.7 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Income $5.8 $6.6 $7.4 $7.9 $10.3 
E.P.T. .3 
It is quite evident that the Excess Profits Tax 
of 1950 will not be so damaging as the Excess Profits Tax 
during the war years. Yet, we must consider that the tax 
was figured on one-ha:.lf of the year while in 1951, the full 
30% will be used. Also, if the adjus.ted figure of $500,000 
is considered, the money used to pay the tax could account 
for a~ost 1/6 of the total interest on long-term debt ex-
pense. This is an ~portant carrsideration for the interest 
on the debt of Public Utilities is considerable. 
Schedule of Consolidated Net Income (in millions) 
- (Sourc.e is Annual Reports] 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
$3.9 $3.8 $4.8 $5.3 $4.7 $5.1 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
$8.3 $9.1 $10.0 $11.1 $11.5 
The net income of the company has increased about 
three times since 1940 and when the taxes were reduced in 
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1945, the inco.me soared upward. now that a new tax bas been 
effected, increases in income will be nil for the Excess 
Profits Tax shall remove most of those extra dollars. The 
percentage that income my increase before Excess Profits 
Taxes are paid are zero as f'ar a s Central and Sou th West 
Corporation are concerned far with a slight increase in in-
com.et the company paid $300,000 in Excess Profits Taxes alone. 
Schedule of Annual Gross Additions to Unit Plant- (in millions) 
- (Source 1s Annual Reports} 
1940 
$6.2 
1946 
$16.1 
1941 
$8.0 
1947 
$32.8 
1942 
$8.1 
1948 
$29.6 
1943 
$3.3 
1949 
$33.3 
1944 
$4.9 
1950 
$35.2 
1945 
$7. 8 
The additions to utility plant since 1940 have in-
creased almost six times. In 1950, the additions were fi-
nanced chiefly through reinvested earnings f'or only a bout 
$16 million was secured through increasing the long-term debt. 
In fact, in the last few years, a good part of the e xpansio-n 
program. was carried on thrrugh the reinvesting of earnings. 
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Now that an Excess Profits Tax is in effect, the ability of 
the company to retain those extra dollars will be less prac-
tical. 
1940 
$95 
1946 
$84 
Schedule of Loni-term Debt (.!!!_ millions) 
( Sou.rce s An.nuai'"Reports) 
1941. 1942 1943 1944 
$93 $91 $89 $85 
1947 1948 1949 1950 
$94 $115 $122 $137 
1945 
$85 
During the 'WI,ar, C.en tral and South West Corporation 
increased its. funded debt. When the hostilities ceased and 
the expansion program began, the company Wias able to expand 
in. part c:u t of reinvested earnings because of the decline in 
taxes--especially the Excess Profits Tax--and out o.f new bor-
rowed capital. Considering the facts, the increase in funded 
debt is not so great for they bave maintained a well-ba1a:qced 
financial structure for the bonds represent about 50~ of total 
capitalization. 
West 
Schedule of Fixed Obarges Earned After Taxes 
(Source is Annua 1 Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
2.06 1.94 2.05 1.79 2.47 3.12 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
4.07 4.50 4.00 4.17 4.09 
Even though the bonded debt of Central. and south 
System is increasing, the sat'ety of interest payments 
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or the times the long-ter~ debt was earned after taxes has 
been improving. The securities o:r indebtedness in 1950 were 
represented by: 
Central ~ South West Corporation 
2 1/4 to 3% Notes Payable 
Central Poo er and Light Comra ny 
First Mortgage Bonds 
Service A 3 1/8% due 11/1/73 
Service B 3 1/4% due 10/1/77 
Service C 3% due 11/1/80 
$. 3,375,000 
25,000,000 
6,000,000 
10,000,000 
2. 7/f¥/Q Sinking Fund debentures due 1974 5,500,000 
Public Service Company of Oklahoma 
First 1[ortgage Bonds 
Service A 2 3/4% due 7/1/75 
Service B 2 7/8% due 2/1/78 
Southwestern Gas and Electric; Com.:r;a ny 
First Mortgage 
Service A 
Service B 
Ser-vice a 
Service D 
Bends 
3 l/4fo dm· 2/1/70 
3 1/B% due 1/1/78 
3% due 6/1/79 
2 7/8% due 12/1/80 
West 'fe:xas Utilities Comp:tny 
First Mortgage Bonds 
Service A 3 1/F?/fo due 8/1/73 
Servic.e B 3% due 3/1/78 
Total 
22,500,000 
10,000,000 
15,2,00 '000 
7,000,000 
4,500,000 
s,ooo,ooo 
17,820,000 
5,000,000 
t137,895,000 
Schedule of Percentage of Lo~-term Debt to Net. Total 
utiTity Pian"t(Exelud n! Parent coiij)aNJ 
(Source is Annm Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
58 57 55 56 54 55 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950· 
53 49 54 51 53 
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The percent age of long-term debt to net total. 
utility plan.t bas decreased even though the total val.ue was · 
increased. The debt has not grown to the extent of property 
and this is further proof that the expansion carried on by 
Central and South West Corporation was principally with re-
invested earnings. 
1940 
$.44 
1945 
$1 .69 
Schedule of Earnings per Share Common 
( Sol.i"rce is Annual Reports) 
1941 
$.42 
1.947 
$1 .38 
1.942 
$ .39 
1.948 
$1.38 
1.943 
$.55 
1949 
$1.40 
1.944 
$.50 
1950 
$1.44 
1945 
$ .56 
The earnings of the consolidated unit have in-
creased considerab~y s inee the war , but the future earnings, 
with the new taxes, may Lnot be so impress! ve. .Any increase 
1n earnings now will be heavily taxed and the Excess Profits 
Tax will play an important p3. rt. 
Schedule of Dividends per Share of Common stock 
· . -(Srurce is Ann~! Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
--
1946 1947 1948 194.9 1950 
$.35 $.75 $.82i $.90 
The dividends per share of common stock of the 
parent has been good in the last few years for they paid out 
most of their earnings in dividends. The earnings of the 
parent are obtained by dividends from the subsidiaries. 
Although the system showed an income during the war era, 
the parent .was operating at a deficit. Only since 1945 
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of the perio.d studied did Central and South West Cor-
poration operate out of the red. And in 1950, with an in-
come of $.90, a dividend or $ . 90 was paid. Of course such 
a high percentage could not continue but it is hoped that 
the income of the parent will be increased in order to es-
tablish this $.90 dividend. If the Excess Profits Tax was 
not in effect, this would not be as great a problem. 
Schedule £t Capitalization Ratios (Exe~uding Parent ·oomwany) 
(Source is Annual Reports) 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Long-term Debt 53.05 52.55 51.92 51.17 49.90 50.69 
Preferred Stock 19.81 19.89 20.01 19.99 19.60 18.54 
Common Stock Equity 27 .14. 27 .5.6 28.07 28.84. 30.50 30.77 
1946 ~ 1947 . 1948 1949 1950 
Long-term Debt 49.77 49.05 51.47 48.59 50.57 
Pre:ferred Stock 18.32 17.40 14.85 16.19 14.88 
Common Stock Equity 3l,9I 33.55 33.68 35.22 34.55 
The capital structure o:f the system is a well-
balanced financial unit: for a Public Utility Comp:tny .. In 
fact, in most oases it is superior to a great deal of other 
companies for the majority have a 25% of preferred stock 
and 25% common stock equity. Now that the taxes have in-
creased and an Excess Profits Tax is: in effect, we can look 
for an increase in the funded debt as the company expands. 
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According to the new tax progrrun, about $ .24 out 
of every dollar of operating revenue went for taxes as com-
pared with $.21 in 1949. With the increase in ratio for 1951, 
the tax will be raised to $.26 out of every dollar of oper-
ating revenue. This of course shall play an important part 
in the future expansion program for the, reinvested earnings 
available for expansion purposes, will diminish. 
Chap.ter VI 
Conclusion 
In order to fully understand an Excess Profits 
llo. 
Tax and its effect on business, it would be most fitting to 
present the views of other men who have written on the sub-
ject in the last few m.on ths. In the conoludi.n.g chapter, I 
shall try to present to the best of my ability, the ar guments 
pro and eon which have been brooght forward by labor, mE:tnage-
ment and others. 
It is difficult to say at this time that we should 
or should not have an Excess Profits Tax for we are i n a period 
of defensive mobilization. Tbat the government is in need of 
funds is not questioned but the way in which they obtain these 
revenues is. If through their method of taxation, they h·inder 
the very wheels of progress which nake this country as strong 
as it is, then the means should be modified. Yet on the other 
hand, i .f the methods used are the lesser of two evils, then 
the lesser must be taken. 
The expansion program which has been demanded of 
business by consumers is astounding and also, business's in-
creased produ ction is favored by the government. It is the 
purpose of the executive branch of the United States t o build 
up production to a point where civiliar1 and military needs 
can be met withaat either suffering. In order to accomplis h 
this feat, the industrial might of our country must expand 
and expansion costs money. Bonds must be sold along wit h 
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stocks in order to obtain the necessary capital required so 
that the companies may be in a position to expand. In the 
past, growth was facilitated by the reinvestment of earnings. 
But now, due to the extent and time elements of the progra m, 
the companies are faced with a shortage of earnings out of 
which expansion cou.ld be faeil-i tated. So, the companies are 
compelled to borrow and in turn weaken their financial struc-
ture to some degree. 
Now let us consider what has caused a shorta ge of 
earnings so that now so many must go out into the market to 
borrow funds in order to meet their obl.igations. one of the 
main reasons has been the Excess Profits Tax. During the war, 
it is true to say that we all had to do our share and that 
the industrial machine of our country should not m~e a pro-
fit at the expense of the government. It is also truer to 
say tmt because of th:ii.s tax, nnny companies suffered and it 
took several years after hostilities ceased in order to af-
firm that the ccmpany was back on its feet. Also, because of 
the high Excess Profits Tax the companies were left in a 
weakened financial position even though their production an.d 
sales were the greatest ever achieved. Since the Excess 
:Profits Tax took such a large slice of the profits, the net 
income was much less than before. 
~so, it is well to note that the Excess Profits 
Tax during the war created many hardships because of its 
inequalities. The Public Utilities Industry for instance is 
controlled by the Public Utility Commission in each s.tate 
and the rates that the companies can charge are set by the 
commdssion which in turn limits or controls their income. 
Now during the war, the Excess Profits Tax did not take into 
consideration such an injus.tice and PUblic Utilities were 
taxed under the act even though their profits were regulated 
by government authorities. Of course, this works both ways 
for the Railroads which are also under a controlled commission, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, were never affected by 
the E •. P.T. for their earnings were never large enough to pay 
a tax and yet they profited the most by the war ghrough in-
creased freight and passenger traffic. Under the new l aw , 
however, remedies have been attempted and yet some claim that 
the law bas so ms ny loopholes tba t it, also, is unjust. 
Labor unions ba. ve entered the picture of taxation 
for they have becaae the spokesman for all their members who 
comprise most of our laboring force. Since the labor ing man 
pays the largest part of our individual incone tax, he is 
always looking for ways and means to reduce the indi vidual 
t ax rate in the lower income brackets. This seems only 
reasonable for we always try to do things which benefit our-
selves. Now, the enactment of an E.P.T. seems to be about 
the best solution, for it limits to a great degree the 
amount of incane of corporate entities. Thi s in turn equal-
izes the amount going to labor and to the stockholders for 
by the E.P.T., the individual rates can be reduced by off-
setting the amount received from E.P.T·. So, labor on the 
most part is for an E. P.T. 
In Mr. Arthur A. Elder 's report before the House 
ays and Means Com.mi ttee on November 18, 1950, as a con-
sultant from the tax com.m.i ttee of the Am.eric.an Federa tion 
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of Labor, he said, "The American Federation of Labor is 
strongly in favo r of financing the regular expense s of 
government and costs of defense programs as nearly as pos-
sible out of current tax revenues. Two successive tax re-
duction measures approved since orld a.r II have undoubt-
edly contributed substantially to bringing about t he crisis 
which now makes it necessary to raise additional tax funds. 
The need for remedying this situation involving the threat 
of continually recurring deficits in the federal budget as 
recognized by your committee in the study it gave to in-
creasing revenues even before the invas ion of Korea . e 
appreciate that these hearings are being held as a necessary 
preliminary to completing the program directed at i ncreasing 
over-all tax income embodied in the Revenue ct of 1950, re-
cently enacted by Congress. At the time of its enactment, 
we were disappointed that a tax on excess profits was not 
adopted. e now hope, therefore, that your committee will 
reco~end a substantial increase in the taxation of cor-
porate profits. 
Consideration o.f equity as well as the over-all 
interests of the economy suggest that the proposal to in-
crease revenue from corporate profits at an annual rate of 
·4 billion is moderate. i·e believe tb<:J. t considerably in 
excess of this amount--certainly not less than $ 5 to '6 
billion dollars--would, if properly distributed, involve no 
s·erious hardship to corporation at the present level of 
earnings. 
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The :AJ:D.erican Federation of Labor has become alarmed 
at the increasing tendency at all levels of government since 
·worl d War II to depend mat*"e and more on ta::x:es on consumers 
and less on taxes based on ability to pay. In fiscal year 
1945, a year of peak war time revenue, $34.2 billion out of 
$53 .05 billion, or 64 . 47 percent of the total tax revenue at 
all levels of government , was derived from taxes on in-
dividual and corporate income (.$18.7 billion on individual , 
plus $15.5 billion on corporate incorre). In 1949, by con-
trast , with total tax revenues a half billion dollars higher 
than in 1945 tax collections of $27.9 billion on income had 
fallen to 53.1 percent of total collec:tions of' $53.58 billion. 
The earlier tax adjustment s made by Congres s in the 
personal income tax field resulted in a disproportionately 
large share of tax savings to taxpayers in the groups with 
net income ~mbov.e $4000 • . .Amendln:lnts to the personal income 
tax under the Revenue Act of 1950 will result in an increa se 
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in schedule rates to approximately 3 points below the rates 
i n effect under the 1944 Act. e do not believe that t his 
approximation of t he wartime persona 1 income tax rates es-
tablished by the 1950 Act has achieved either the equity or 
the equality of sacrifice recommended by P.residen t Truman. 
Inequities ba ve developed in the over-all tax situation as 
well as within the tax structure itself which have been given 
legislative sanction during the post war years. ~ile de-
creases in taxes on income were taking place, revenue from 
excise and sales tax and customs receipts rose f r om $8 . 4 
bil1ion in 1945 to $12.6 in 1949--a 50 p.ercent- increase. 
This in our opinion constitutes a disporportionately heavy 
burden on consumers, particularly in view of the circumstance 
that the federally imposed wartime 'emergency" excise taxes 
continue in effect and represent such a large proportion o:f 
this excessive burden on consumers ·. 
The proposal to increase tax revenue on corporate 
income therefore would appear to be equitable, would provide 
needed revenue, and would restore a needed balance to the 
tax structure. Moreover, the proposed_ increase is not, in 
our opinion, excessive in the lignt of the continued high 
level of corporate profits since 1945. Profits for the cur-
rent year will be only slight~y less than the $20.9 billion 
in profits after t axes by corporations in 1948 even after the 
adoption of additional taxes as proposed by Secretary Snyder. 
I f a mea.sure providing for increased corporate 
taxes is adopted by Congress, we believe this increase in 
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the corporate taxes should be made before consideration is 
gi ven to further upward adjustments in categories of taxation 
from which a disproportionately large share of revenue is now 
being derived. 
We do not believe that proposals to i ncrease the 
corporate rate rrom 45 percent to 57 percent or to impose a 
26 2/3 percent special profits tax on current tax liabilities 
of corporations under the 45 percent rate would be either 
practical or equitable methods of raising the proposed i n-
crease in revenue. Such flat rate increases would work 
sericns hardship on new corporations and corporations with 
low rates of return on net worth, but would not seriously em-
barrass cor-porations with high rates of return. 
On the other hand, we believe the proposa l to enact 
a special profits t ax taking into account the difference in 
variation in return on net worth is equitable. Allowing cor-
porations to cn.oose any three of the years 1946- 1949 as the 
base period would minimize the possibility of working a hard-
ship on the corporation which might have had a particularly 
bad year during the period. We consider the proposal to re-
duc e base period earnings by 25 percent for purposes of c om-
puting the base credit reasonable and equitable • . In our 
opinion the rates to determine the alternative invested capital 
credi t should not be increased by ~ore than the 1/4 to 1/3 
of rates allowed under the World Wa r II tax. We believe 
that addi tioilal. proposals to make provision for increased 
capital allowance , credit for reinvestment of earnings , a 
minimum credit of $25,000 and a tax rate of 75 percent on 
income above the base, take care of objections that have 
been made to the enactment of this type of tax. Certainly 
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it would seem that in the light of experience the proposals 
show that consideration has been given to eliminating possible 
inequities as betwee n taxpayers, giving necessary stimulation 
to expansion of establisher businesses, providing special 
consideration for ne w corporati ons, and proYiding_ a tax rate 
that is not excessive in view of the liberal provision made 
for base earning credits. 
We would urge tbat your Comm.i ttee take favorable 
action on the recommendation of the President to increase 
corporate income tax revenues retroactively to ~uly 1, 1950. 
We believe that enactment of sueh a tax at this time wou l d 
give balance to the tax structure, would constitute a neces-
sary support to efforts to cb:.eck inflationary tendencies, 
would provide needed revenue, and would constitute no ex-
cessive burden on corporate taxpayers who at the current level 
of economic activity would continue to operate with very high 
earnings and at a high rate of return.~ 
Also the Department of Education and Research of 
the Congress of Industrial Organization in the pamphlet 
No. 160 on~ Federal!!! Program, page 22, says, 
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"Excess Profits: Corporation reports indicate 
profit peaks above the war years. Such profits indicate that 
the excess profits tax was repealed too soon. Even a fter 
World War I it, was realized that the end of the war did not 
bring with it the end of the need for an effective means of 
recouping excess profits. Although world war I ended in 
1918, the excess profits tax was not eliminated until the end 
of 19 21. With government expenditures continuing at an all-
time high for a peacetime year, the continuation of an excess 
profits tax is indicated. · It is proposed, therefore, t hat 
the excess profits tax be r eenacted, except a s to the rate . 
The credit allowed for exces s profits tax purposes, which is 
deemed to represent normal profits, is in fact f ar in excess 
of normal profits. On an avera ge f or the period 1936-39, all 
cor porations reported net inco rr:e, before taxes, of abou t $5 
billion. The credit claimed by corporat i ons for exces s prof its 
tax purposes for 1944, was over $14 billion. Among the ex-
planations for this are the many variations in computing the 
credit which combine to increase the credit . Thus, for · ex-
ample, corporations which now earn large amounts bu t were 
deficit corporations before the war, may cla im a credit on the 
invested capital basis which is far in excess of earnings they 
e ver made. Also , where the income method is used , adjust-
ments may be mde for years whe n earni ngs were le ss than 
75 percen t of the average, or corporat i cns showed so-called 
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indications of grow th. All in all, for 1944, profits which 
were regarded as 'normal' were almost three t imes the earnings 
of all corpora tions during the base period. 
The excess profits tax is so constituted that the 
port ion of net i ncome subject to the t ax is not subject to 
normal income tax. In view of th i s, the rate which is sug-
gested, wh ile substant ially less than the wartime rate, should 
be a good deal higher than the norma l rate, i.e., ?5 percent , 
is therefore r ecommended. In addi t ion, it is recommended 
that corpora tions be permitted an exemption equal to 125 
percent of the base period 1936-39 examption.~ 
In the CIO Executive Boa rd's Economic Policy state-
ment of August 29, 1950 at washington, D.O., t he follow i ng 
was said. "The present naticnal ermrgency dema nds the com-
plete and unhesitating cooperation of every individual in 
.America. In this crisis·, organized labor is deeply conscious · 
of i t s responsibilities and i ts opportunities to serve our 
common cause. 
The full utilization of labor's skills, i ntel ligence 
and experience will contrl bu. te much to the success of the 
mobilization effort. To millions of people all over the 
wor ld the lies of Communist propaganda will be more clearly 
revealed by the f act of a leading role for American trade 
unions in the world-wide struggle for Democracy. 
The strength of our country lies in its gr eat 
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productive power. Labor has constantly championed the need 
for continual expansion of this production power. For many 
years, we ·have fougnt against the short-sighted policies of 
many big business groups which have preach ed the inevitability 
of depression and have sought to contract rather than expand 
our industrial capacity. 
We have new problems today, entirely different 
from those our country faced in 1939, when we had a reservoir 
of unused resources. But we do have greater experie nce, 
better skills and programs, new technical advances and i m-
provements. We can produce more than ever before. our task 
is to increase our productive capacity even furthe r so that 
our military defense will be fully su~plied and our civilian 
population provided with all its essential needs. That ex-
pansion will leave us more adequately prepared for whatever 
demand s the future course of international affairs may bring. 
At the same time, i t will help to co~bat more effectively the 
damaging pressures of inflation at hom__e." 
Also, Excess Profits Tax. ftCorporate profi ts after 
. . 
taxes at the pr esent time are accum__ulating at the excessive 
rate of a lmost $25 billion per year. The Government should 
enact an adequate excess profits tax which would prevent 
profiteering, help pay our increased defense costs and avoid 
increases in the national debt. We cannot wait for 1951. A 
real excess profits tax must be enacted now." 
Now, let us look at another side of the tax pic-
ture for the National Association of Manufacturers in its 
summary of An Excess Prof'its !!! is Against The :PUblic In-
terest, No. 33, October 1950 said, " I t is shown that an ex-
cess profits tax is against the public interest because it 
is economically unsound, administratively unworkable, and 
contributory to inflation. 
The fact remains that during a period of defense 
or actual war there must be a substantial increa se of t x 
revenue , and the corporation income tax is a logical source 
of' a part of this increase. 
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The most important, and also the most difficult 
matter, in mking decisions about the corporation income tax , 
is that of attitudes. It is so easy to yield to the clamor 
incited by prejudice, so difficult to hold to the hard, though 
unpopular facts of experience. Corporations are essential ly 
tax collectors, not tax bearers. The actual bearers of any 
corporation tax inc1ude, in part, the consumers , and in part 
the investors who own the company. In an important respect, 
a corporation tax is a choice of methods, being one way of 
levying more on consumers, stockholders, or both. Neverthe-
less, since it is a very convenient method, it will doubt-
less always be used , and we rm.y expect an increase of the tax 
rate as a feature of emergency financing. 
Another fact of experience is that there is no way 
of making a clear and sharp distinction between 'war' profits 
and other profits. Any profit at al l that a company may 
earn from.. a govern.Ill3nt contract during war is a 'war' 
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prof it. In a certain sense all of the profits earned in a 
war economy are 'war' profits, whether they come from munitions 
contracts, renting hotel . rooms, or selling goods and services 
to the civilian population. The most intelligent course to 
pursue in approaching the problem of increased revenue 
through the taxation of corporations is to forego the whole 
futile effort at a distinction between the sources of profit, 
or i~ the character of profit, and to provide for an in-
crease of the tax load on all corporation profit without 
regard to origin or amount. 
It is submitted that the Corporation Defense Tax 
whi ch is outlined on page 3 of this document resolves all of 
these problems. It recognizes that more corporation tax 
must be paid during a defense or war emergency, and it applies 
the increase to all corporation income without regard to its 
origin in war business or other business. It escapes the 
- administrative and compliance difficulties of an excess profits 
tax , and it will provide whatever additional revenue may be 
required from this tax source without impair ing the incen-
tives of management and wi thout bleeding the economy white so 
far as concerns continued capital formation. In particular, 
it will be much less severe as applied to small business than 
an excess profits tax is likely to be. 
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The duration of the present defense eme rgency , and 
of the heavy t ax load that must be assumed, cannot now be 
foreca s t, On the most optimistic basis of calculation , 
however, t he emergency and the increased tax burden will en-
dure for some years. It is therefore of the gravest impor-
tance that the measures taken for accomplishing the finan-
cial task be such as will rmke possible some further gro th 
of the nation 's productiv e capacity rather than freezing an 
ster ilizing our national economic pot ential. " 
Als o , in concluding, nit has been shown that an 
excess profits tax is against the public inter est because it 
is economically unsound , admini stratively unworkable, and 
contributes to inflation. 
The fact remains , however, that during a period of 
defense or actual war there must be a substantial i ncrease 
of tax revenue , and the corporation income tax is a logic 1 
source of a part of this increase . 
In view of these considerat i ons , i t is submitted 
that the corporation Defense Tax which i s outli n ed on page 
3 of this document re solves all of these problems. It re -
cognizes that more corporat ion income tax mu st be paid 
during a defense or war emergency, and it applies the in-
crease to all corporation income without regard to it·s origin 
in war bus ire ss or other business. It escapes the adminis -
trative and compliance difficulties of' an excess profits tax, 
and it will provide whatever additional revenue may be re-
quired from the corporation tax without impairing the in-
centives of mnagen:ent and bleeding the economy white so 
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far as concerns continued capital formation. In particular, 
it will be much less severe as applied to small business than 
an exce ss profits tax is likely to be. 
The duration of the present defense emergency, and 
of t...'le heavy tax load that must be assumed, cannot no be 
forecast. On t.'ll.e most optimistic basis: of calculation, 
however , the emer gency and the increased tax burden will en-
du:re for some years . It is therefore of the gravest con-
sequence that the measures t aken for accomplishing the finan-
cial task be such as will make possible some further growth 
of the nationts productive ca a.c ity rather than freezing and 
s t er ilizing ru r national economic oten tial . tt 
·he amount of reinvested earnings that are neede d 
for the success of any busire ss vary according to the in-
dustry and hence a tax that does not take thi s into con-
sider ation seems ~uite unfair . The money needed in the oil 
industry is m..uch greater than in other industr ies. As r . 
Eugene Holman, President of Standard Oil Company stated i a 
stateme nt before the Subcommittee of a JOint Congressional 
om.mittee on the Economic Report, Decemb er 15, 1948, ttAs 
percentage ei.ther of total income or of investment , profits 
i n the oil industry tend to be higher than in many other i n-
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dustrie s. This is a r eflec t ion of the nature of the business. 
Profits fo r the oil indus try ba ve to be higher than in many 
othe r line s of wo r k if the industry i s to do its job, especially 
during periods of increasing requirements. 
Petroleum is a natura l r esource industry . As the 
c ons uming public uses up th e oil f rom existing fields , it is 
the industry's business to find and develop new fie l ds . 
Oil companies have the twofold task , not only of 
turni ng out products to meet the needs of toda y ' s cons umer 
but of de veloping r esources and fac ilities to me et the still 
greater needs of fu tur e consumers . 
This is an expensive undertaki ng , involvi ng great 
risks . Many who assume these risks go broke . s you gent le-
men ba ve no dou.bt heard befor e, :four out of e ve ry five wild-
cat wells drilled i n the United States tur n out t o be dry 
holes. outside the United State s a .s well, millions of dol-
lars have been spent without finding a barrel of oil. Also , 
in many parts of the world , political r i s k s are adde d to what 
may be called the geological risks. 
In a dynamic industry such as oil , therefore, very 
l arge sums of new cap i tal must be poured into the business 
regularly. The situa tion is qui te di ffe rent from more stat i c 
businesses where, after the initial investmnt , operat i ons 
can be kept going with relatively small amounts spent for 
replacement. 
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In this country the demand f or oil has risen more 
than 60 per cent since 1940, and it is still on the uptrend . 
In meeting people "s demands for its products, the oil in-
dustry has measured up , particularly when one considers the 
magnitude of the problems it has faced in the postwar period . 
It is a highly ccmpetive industry and, I believe, one of the 
most progressive and efficient. Its success in providing n 
bundance of etroleum products has been a v itally important 
factor in raising our standard of living. 
As striking examples of expenditures required by 
the oi l industry to meet people's needs, I shoul d like to 
cite some calculations we recently made. Each additional 
automobile on the road requires an oil company expenditure of 
$530; each new home oil burner ~ 670; each new transport plane 
$221,000. This is what must be spent by the oil industry to 
provide the new capacity to fuel and lubricate this equip-
ment. It costs more than twice as much now to do these jobs 
as it did before the war." 
I cannot stres s too strongly the opinions held by 
some individuals as to the fairness of the act. In the 
Christian Scie nce Monitor as reported by the associated press 
in wa shington, the following appeared, nsena tor Flanders said 
such a l evy woul d have i ts theaviest impact on compa nies that 
have had the hardest row to hoe' since the end of -~ • • I and 
'wouldn't do anythin~ to General Motors, u.s. Steel, chemical 
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companies and others which have had record pea cetime profits. 
The war profits of these latter companie s he said, 
'typically are not so great as in peacetime while sh ipbuilding, 
machine "tool and ai r pla ne engine companie s t which. made big 
profits during t he war have since gone into the red.n 
Also i it is interesting t o see just what has hap-
pened under ou r past experiences with the E.P.T. Man agement 
ba s offered little res.istance to those factors whi ch cause 
increased expenses forin turn , the larger the expense, t he 
greater the tax deduction and therefore a lower tax bra cket 
hence,_ increased profit. 
Some of the wa ys in wl:J.ich the expense accounts of 
·the companies ha ve increased is by over-maintenance. The 
pla nts during the war were never in such good condition be-
f or e in that the greater the repa irs, the greater the deduc-
tion. This of a~rse, in a sense , was reinvesting earnings 
for after the war, the revenue needed for major repairs was 
negl.igible because of the excellent conditions in which they 
we re n:aintained during the Excess Profits Tax era.. Now that 
a ne w Excess Profits Tax is i n effect, will this happen again? 
The Wall Street ~ournal of April 18, 1951 carried 
an article of extreme interest which armmarized a speech 
given by Mr. Ruml and went as fo~lows. ttpayment of an Excess 
Profits Tax by a company in 1952 will be a sign of weak 
management, according to Beardsley Ruml, former chairman of 
the New York Federal Reserve Bank. 
Mro. Ruml told the a n nual meeting of the Gas 
Appliance Manufacturers Association that the excess profits 
tax l aw created two kinds of money--tcheap earned dollars' 
and 'expensive earned dollars'. 
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Cheap earned dollars, R. Ruml explained are those 
which will be taxed at excess profl ts tax rates if not spent. 
Expensive earned dollars, he said , are those which are taxed 
a.t ordinary corporate rates. 
The existence of cheap dollars 'makes prudent many 
business activities' that would not otherwise be advisable , 
Mr . Ruml said. ·'The excess profits tax is therefore not a 
burden, but a subsidy. It provides cheap dollars to the 
profitable and established company, dollars which c-an and 
must be used by a responsible management to safeguard and ex-
t end the position of suc.h a company' , he added• 
He cited ways that business could spend these 
cheap dollar s to advantage. These included research on ne w 
products, reorganizat i on of production, ~esting the products, 
opening of new branch offices and repair and ms intenance of' 
facilities. 
Cheap do·lla rs also wil l permit adequate staffing 
at the executiv·e level, Mr. Ruml said. He added this would 
permit lengthening of training periods in anticipation of 
ret ire-roo nt s. 
If a company has only expensive dol,.lars to spend, 
Mr. Ruml said, it is at a serious disadvantage as compared 
wi.th a competitor which has tax-created dollars at its dis -
posal. 
While urging blsiness to spend its cheap dollars 
to strengthen its posit ion, Mr. Ruml warned against the 
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;asteful use of these funds. Good faith, .he said, is required 
to prevent actions harmful to the national i nterest. He 
cited the practice of hoarding skilled labor as 'an obvious 
case of a buse '. 
The former Rese rve Bank official asserted there is 
nothing evil in avoidance of excess profits taxes. 'It is 
not only proper ', he said, ' but it is the d.u ty of manageme nt 
to minimize by a 11 lawful means the tax consequenc e s of 
business decisions'. 
Mr. Ruml said he opposed the excess profits tax 
because it is not a wo rkabls tax system.. No tax system will 
work, he explained, unless it is largely self-enforcing. The 
average taxpayer, he said, must feel that he is fair ly treated. 
He called the excess profits tax an 'evil brew of inequit y, 
except ion, exemption and privilege.' 
:Furthermore, he declared, such a tax is 'harmf'ul 
to investment and there f ore to the building up of fixed assets 
necessary to an expanding economy.' 
Mr. Ruml predicted that the excess profits tax la 
will not be re-enaeted when it expires on JUly 1, 1953. By 
that tiroo, however, 'many business mamgers will ha ve found 
their competitive position substant i al ly improved by reason 
of the cheap dollars at their disposal.'" 
136. 
I believe that the pos ition of Mr. Ruml, as sum-
marized by the Wall Street Journal, presents the point I 
wished to mke in my the sis, The greatest danger in my es-
timation is th.e effect on the investment and in turn ex-
pansion. If our grea t eountry i s going to meet thi s threat 
that world politics has confronted us with, the government 
shou ld find bette r ways in which to tax in order to. permit 
our grea t industrial machine to expand and also allow for the 
innovations which have made our country the greatest in the 
world today. 
Also, I would not like the reade r to l eave with the 
impress ion that I do not recognize the position of l abor or 
that I do not respect thei r position but I do fee l the re are 
other methods of taxation tha t would permit l abor and the 
common man reduced tax burdens and yet permit the growth of 
free enterprise . 
l3?. 
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